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Across a variety of decision domains, older adults desire fewer options than 
younger adults, but underlying mechanisms of these age differences remain unknown. 
Three studies (total N = 586) were conducted to investigate the extent to which age 
differences in choice set size preferences are driven by decision-making self-efficacy, 
maximizing, motivational priorities, and other theoretically implicated covariates. 
First, a large-scale survey (Study 1) examined the age trajectory of, and underlying 
influences on, choice set size preferences in a life-span sample. Subsequent 
laboratory-based experiments (Studies 2a-2c) manipulated self-efficacy, maximizing, 
and motivational priorities, respectively, among younger adults and measured effects 
on choice set size preferences and information search. Finally, a laboratory-based 
quasi-experimental design (Study 3) assessed the effect of experimentally manipulated 
self-efficacy on older versus younger adults' decision making. Combined results 
suggest that age differences in choice set size preferences are linear, gradual, and 
relatively domain-general. They are not mediated by any of the variables tested, with 
the exception of vocabulary scores, which accounted for 1.5% of variance in choice 
set size preferences above and beyond age. However, inter-individual differences, if 
not age differences, in choice set size preferences and information seeking may be 
amenable to altering via manipulations of decision-making self-efficacy. Implications 
for research on aging and decision-making, as well as public policy, are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
  Contemporary decision makers are often faced with a glut of options from 
which to choose, whether the choice itself is as trivial as a candy bar or as 
consequential as health insurance. Many people may welcome having so many 
options, insofar as people typically prefer larger over smaller choice sets (Chernev, 
2006; Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). On the other hand, not all people want 
the same amount of choice, and accumulating evidence suggests that the desire for 
large choice sets wanes with age. Specifically, older adults, relative to younger adults, 
prefer fewer options (Reed, Mikels, & Simon, 2008; Rozin, Fischler, Shields, & 
Masson, 2006) and place lower value on increased choice (Mikels, Reed, & Simon, 
2009). Such age differences in choice set size preferences appear to be robust and 
generalize across various decision domains (Reed et al., 2008). The underlying causes, 
however, remain unclear. 
 The present studies investigated potential explanations of age differences in 
choice set size preferences implicated by previous theorizing or empirical research. 
Particular emphasis was placed on three constructs which are associated with choice-
related aspects of decision-making and appear to change with age: Self-efficacy, 
which refers to confidence in one’s ability to achieve positive outcomes for a given 
task or domain (Bandura, 1997); maximizing versus satisficing, which refers to the 
habitual tendency in decision-making to aim for the best possible choice versus one 
that is good enough (Schwartz et al., 2002); and age-related changes in the relative 
prioritization of emotion-regulatory versus information-seeking goals (Carstensen, 
2006). Combined results of these studies shed light on the complex mechanisms of age 
differences in decision making. 
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 Choice Set Size: Preferences and Consequences 
 Before answering the focal question of why preferences for more or less choice 
change with age (i.e., descriptive explanations), it is instructive to consider why 
people should prefer larger versus smaller choice sets and vice versa, based on the 
relative “benefits” versus “costs” of choice in decision making. Beginning with 
Iyengar and Lepper’s (2000) seminal work on the detrimental effects of increased 
choice in decision making, a wave of studies over the past decade examined the 
consequences of choosing from larger versus smaller choice sets. However, 
cumulative results of these studies cast doubt on early findings and suggest that the 
effects of choice are neither reliable nor robust (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 
2010). 
In a recent meta-analysis of 50 studies on “choice overload”, which refers to 
the notion that increased choice impairs satisfaction and motivation to choose, 
Scheibehenne and colleagues (2010) found evidence of significant heterogeneity in 
results across studies. Several studies demonstrated that choosing from large versus 
small choice sets may impair motivation and incur emotional costs, from increased 
frustration with the decision process to decreased satisfaction and greater regret 
regarding one’s choice (Chernev, 2006; Haynes, 2009; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). By 
contrast, multiple studies found no effect of large versus small choice sets on 
likelihood to choose or satisfaction (Scheibehenne, 2008; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, 
& Todd, 2009), while other studies reported evidence of increased motivation when 
choosing from larger versus smaller choice sets (Gao & Simonson, 2008; Kahn & 
Wansink, 2004). 
To explain the high degree of variance in effect sizes across studies, 
Scheibehenne and colleagues (2010) tested potential moderators of the choice 
overload effect via a meta-regression analysis. Results indicated that increased choice 
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promotes motivation in studies examining consumption quantity as opposed to other 
dependent variables (e.g., satisfaction, likelihood to choose). Increased choice also 
appears beneficial to individuals with clear preferences or expertise. In addition to 
these substantive moderators, the meta-regression also indicated two moderators 
related to the study publication: Specifically, studies that were published (versus 
unpublished) and older (versus more recent) were more likely to report significant 
evidence of choice overload effects. 
 To supplement the results of the meta-regression analysis, Scheibehenne and 
colleagues (2010) posited several moderators of the choice overload effect that were 
relatively idiosyncratic (i.e., appearing in only one study). One category of 
hypothesized moderators consists of characteristics of the choice environment. For 
instance, choice overload effects appear more likely for decisions involving more 
(versus fewer) trade-offs among options (Chernev, 2005), more (versus less) 
information to consider (Greifeneder, Scheibehenne, & Kleber, 2010), and 
considerable (versus minimal) time pressure faced by decision-makers (Inbar, Hanko, 
Botti, & Gilovich, 2008). Scheibehenne and colleagues (2010) also hypothesized that 
characteristics of the decision maker moderate the choice overload effect. For 
example, individuals are more prone to choice overload effects when they anticipate 
having to justify their decisions (versus not; Scheibehenne et al., 2009) or maximize 
(versus satisfice; Dar-Nimrod, Rawn, Lehman, & Schwartz, 2009). Although these 
proposed moderators are supported by evidence from individual studies, the limited 
number and idiosyncratic nature of studies testing each moderator hinders, if not 
precludes, meta-analytic support. As such, Scheibehenne and colleagues (2010) 
concluded that, while there appear to be “potentially important preconditions” (p. 421) 
for the choice overload effect, it remains unclear what conditions might be sufficient 
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for the effect to occur. Clearly, then, additional research is needed to further 
investigate the effects of choice set size on decision making. 
 In contrast to the plethora of studies examining the effects of choice set size on 
decision-related outcomes, relatively few studies have examined the extent to which 
individuals desire choice, let alone influences on these preferences. What few studies 
do exist, however, consistently show that people typically prefer larger versus smaller 
choice sets, even when it is not necessarily adaptive (or even maladaptive) to do so. 
For example, when choosing between two hypothetical banks, participants preferred a 
bank which offered 2 types of accounts versus one with only 1 account, even when the 
additional account option wasn’t beneficial (Bown, Read, & Summers, 2003). 
Likewise, supermarket shoppers are more likely to sample varieties of jams when 
there are 24 versus 6 options, even though they are less likely to purchase any of the 
alternatives from the large versus small choice set (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
Preferences for larger versus smaller choice sets have been demonstrated for decisions 
ranging from the mundane (e.g., snacks, chocolates, and pens) to the consequential 
(e.g., vacation hotels; Chernev, 2006), suggesting that increased choice is a powerfully 
enticing factor in decision making. Recent studies suggest, however, that it is by no 
means universal. 
 
 Age Differences in Choice Set Size Preferences 
 The so-called “lure of choice” (Bown et al., 2003) appears to wane across the 
life span. For example, older adults report a preference for significantly fewer options 
(roughly half) relative to younger adults across a variety of decision domains, from 
hospitals to apartments (Reed et al., 2008). Moreover, in the study by Reed and 
colleagues (2008), age was negatively correlated with choice set size preferences 
within the group of older adults, suggesting that age differences in choice set size 
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preferences are not merely the result of cohort effects. Though the age difference in 
choice set size preferences was significant across all domains, a smaller difference was 
observed among healthcare versus everyday domains, suggesting that choice set size 
preferences may be domain-sensitive, if not domain-specific. 
 Age differences in choice set size preferences are even apparent in significant 
medical decisions, as revealed in a large-scale survey demonstrating that patients’ 
desire for choices and active roles in decision making (i.e., shared or patient-centered 
decision-making) peaks at around the age of 45, and is lower thereafter (Levinson, 
Kao, Kuby, & Thisted, 2005). Moreover, age differences in preferences for choice 
appear to transcend nationalities, as demonstrated by a cross-cultural study of choice 
set size preferences for ice cream flavors in which age was negatively associated with 
preferring large (50 flavors) versus small (10 flavors) choice sets (Rozin et al., 2006). 
 Not only do older adults desire fewer choices when making decisions, but they 
also place significantly lower value (reflected in reduced willingness to pay) on 
increased choice in decisions (Mikels et al., 2009). Thus, converging evidence 
suggests reduced preferences for, and valuation of, large choice sets with age. These 
effects have been observed across a variety of choice domains and populations, 
suggesting a robust developmental trend. However, all prior studies used self-report 
measures and/or hypothetical decisions, which casts doubt on the generalizability of 
their results to behavioral choice paradigms involving real consequences. In addition, 
because these studies were largely descriptive in nature, the underlying causes of age 
differences in choice set size preferences remain opaque. In previous work I 
hypothesized that these findings might reflect cognitive and/or motivational influences 
(Reed et al., 2008), but to date none of these hypotheses have been tested. 
Based on an extensive review of the research literature regarding choice set 
size preferences and age differences in decision making, I identified three factors as 
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potential mediators of the age differences discussed above: Decision-making self-
efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities with respect to emotion-regulatory 
versus information-seeking goals. Each of the three factors is discussed separately and 
in more detail below. 
 
 Decision-Making Self-Efficacy and Choice Set Size Preferences 
 One potential explanation for the previously observed age differences in choice 
set size preferences is that older adults simply perceive large choice sets as exceeding 
their decision-making abilities. There is little question among researchers that 
increased choice poses a greater challenge to decision-makers through elevated 
information-processing demands (Schwartz, 2004). Whether such demands deter 
versus attract decision makers, however, may depend on individuals’ decision-making 
self-efficacy (DMSE). According to self-efficacy theory, people tend to avoid or 
expend little effort on activities that they perceive as excessively challenging, but 
engage effortfully and persist with tasks that they believe themselves capable of 
completing successfully (Bandura, 1982). For instance, people with higher DMSE 
prefer decisions that are more challenging and complex (Tabernero & Wood, 2009) 
and seek more information when making decisions (Seijts, Latham, Tasa, & Latham, 
2004) than those who are relatively low in efficacy. The positive association between 
self-efficacy and information seeking has been replicated across a variety of domains, 
including consumer choices (Hu, Huhmann, & Hyman, 2007), careers (Blustein, 
1989), and health-related decisions (Woodward & Wallston, 1987). However, no 
previous studies have directly investigated the effects of DMSE on preferences for 
choice set size, let alone across age groups. 
 The implications of self-efficacy theory for choice set size preferences are 
clear: People with high decision-making self-efficacy should desire more choice (i.e., 
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more challenge) than people with low self-efficacy. From this perspective, older adults 
may prefer less choice because they have lower DMSE and wish to avoid the 
excessive challenges posed by large choice sets. This hypothesis assumes that older 
adults indeed have reduced DMSE relative to young adults, but support for this 
assumption is limited. 
 Empirical evidence for age differences in DMSE is equivocal, with one study 
finding an increase in DMSE with age (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007), one 
reporting a decrease (Woodward & Wallston, 1987), and one reporting no association 
between age and DMSE (Finucane & Gullion, 2010). While these inconsistent results 
may result from differences in sample characteristics, it is also possible that they 
reflect measurement issues. For instance, measures which differentiate among the 
components of healthcare decision-making (e.g., understanding information, obtaining 
the best care) reveal negative associations between age and decision-making self-
efficacy (Woodward & Wallston, 1987), whereas generalized measures of DMSE 
across several healthcare domains do not (Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Löckenhoff & 
Carstensen, 2007). 
 Using component-based measures of decision-making self-efficacy may 
therefore be crucial to detecting age differences. This notion is supported by research 
on memory self-efficacy, where measures that differentiate between various aspects 
and domains of memory in everyday life, such as the Metamemory in Adulthood 
Questionnaire (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983), consistently find an inverse association 
between age and memory self-efficacy (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). In addition, 
because extant studies of age differences in decision-making self-efficacy are limited 
to health-related decisions, it is possible that age differences in self-efficacy are more 
consistent for other domains of decision-making (e.g., consumer and financial 
decisions). Consequently, using measures of decision-making self-efficacy that tap 
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into a wide range of decision domains (i.e., domain-based DMSE) as well as specific 
components of decision-making (i.e., component-based DMSE) may provide a more 
accurate portrayal of age differences. The present research adopted this two-pronged 
approach to measuring DMSE. 
 
 Maximizing versus Satisficing and Choice Set Size Preferences 
 Another major influence on choice-related aspects of decision-making is the 
extent to which individuals habitually attempt to select the best possible option (i.e., 
maximize) or attempt to choose an option that is simply “good enough” (i.e., satisfice; 
Schwartz et al., 2002). Schwartz and colleagues (2002) conceptualized maximizing 
versus satisficing as a relatively stable, trait-like individual difference variable, and 
subsequent research examined differential decision tendencies based on this 
characteristic. Findings demonstrate that people who maximize, relative to those who 
satisfice, prefer and place greater value on larger versus smaller choice sets, despite 
the evidence that maximizers—but not satisficers—are less satisfied with decisions 
among larger versus smaller choice sets (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009)1. For instance, 
individuals who reported higher versus lower maximizing tendencies were more likely 
to frequent ice cream parlors with extensive selections (i.e., 200 flavors) versus 
relatively limited selections (i.e., 20 flavors) and more willing to sacrifice their time 
(e.g., by volunteering to complete a supplemental questionnaire) to choose among 30 
versus 6 chocolates (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009). Maximizers also seek more information 
when making decisions and are less satisfied overall with their decisions relative to 
satisficers (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2002). 
                                                
1 This seemingly ironic finding evokes two potential explanations: On one hand, maximizers may be 
oblivious to the detrimental effects of large choice sets on their satisfaction. Alternatively, they may 
prioritize the goal of selecting the best possible alternative over emotion-regulatory goals such as 
maximizing satisfaction. 
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 Importantly, the tendency to maximize appears to wane with age, such that 
older adults report reduced maximizing tendencies relative to young adults (Tanius, 
Wood, Hanoch, & Rice, 2009). However, no prior study has examined whether age-
related changes in maximizing mediate age differences in choice set size preferences. 
Given that maximizers prefer more choice when making decisions than satisficers, and 
that older adults are less likely to be maximizers than younger adults, it is plausible 
that older adults desire fewer choices than younger adults because of their reduced 
propensity to maximize. 
 
 Motivational Priorities and Choice Set Size Preferences 
 Although trait-like characteristics such as maximizing versus satisficing 
tendencies may contribute to age differences in choice set size preferences, differential 
motivational priorities may play a role as well. This is because larger versus smaller 
choice sets pose diverging consequences with respect to information-seeking goals 
and, in certain contexts, with respect to emotion-regulation goals. 
 In some decision contexts, larger versus smaller choice sets may be detrimental 
with regard to satisfaction and regret, for instance when there are relatively high 
degrees of tradeoffs among options or large amounts of information to consider 
(Chernev, 2005; Greifeneder et al., 2010). Although the choice overload effect is not 
reliable across studies (Scheibehenne et al., 2010), mere belief that larger choice sets 
engender dissatisfaction and regret may be sufficient to influence choice set size 
preferences. For instance, among individuals who are motivated to pursue emotion-
regulatory goals, the belief that excessive choice is associated with worse subjective 
experiences should engender avoidance of large choice sets. 
Although larger choice sets may potentially undermine emotion regulatory-
goals, they are integral to achieving information-related goals. For instance, to make a 
  10 
fully-informed decision one must consider all available alternatives, not simply a 
subset of options. People who pursue information-seeking goals may actually obtain 
more information than they are capable of storing in working memory, which in turn 
may contribute to choice overload effects in certain situations (Iyengar, 2010). Thus, 
information-related goals may be somewhat incompatible with emotion-regulatory 
goals with respect to choice set size preferences. Consequently, decisions among 
larger versus smaller choice sets may necessitate explicit tradeoffs between emotional 
versus informational gains and losses. 
 The outcome of such tradeoffs may vary with age because of a relative shift in 
goal priorities across the adult life span. According to socioemotional selectivity 
theory (Carstensen, 2006), young adults perceive their future as open-ended and 
pursue goals related to information-seeking, whereas older adults view the future as 
relatively limited and, consequently, prioritize emotion-regulatory goals aimed at the 
present moment. Importantly, the decision-making strategies of older versus younger 
adults appear to reflect these diverging motivations (Mather, 2006). For instance, older 
adults disproportionally view positive versus negative information (Löckenhoff & 
Carstensen, 2007, 2008) and misremember their chosen options as being more positive 
(Mather & Johnson, 2000). Moreover, age differences in decision strategies (e.g., 
pattern of information search) and choice quality can be moderated via simple 
motivational manipulations (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007, 2008; Mikels et al., 
2010). Although such evidence suggests that shifting motivations result in age-related 
changes in decision strategies and outcomes, it is not known whether these effects 
extend to choice set size preferences. Based on socioemotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensen, 2006), one would predict that older adults prefer smaller choice sets in 
order to preserve their satisfaction and avoid an unpleasant decision-making 
experience (Reed et al., 2008). 
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 From Choice Set Size Preferences to Information Seeking 
Decision-making self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities are 
likely to influence aspects of decision making beyond choice set size preferences. In 
particular, all three constructs have been associated in previous research with the 
extent of information search. Evidence suggests that people who engage in more 
extensive information search have relatively higher decision-making self-efficacy 
(Seijts et al., 2004), are more prone to maximizing versus satisficing (Iyengar et al., 
2006), and prioritize information-seeking versus emotion regulatory goals  
(Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007, 2008). Because these tendencies shift with age, it is 
perhaps not surprising that older adults, relative to younger adults, seek less 
information when making decisions (Mata & Nunes, 2010). And while the driving 
forces behind age differences in information search are not fully understood, they may 
share underlying mechanisms with choice set size preferences. After all, larger choice 
sets contain more information and afford more information-seeking than smaller 
choice sets, meaning that if one is motivated to seek larger choice sets, the same 
motivations should engender greater information seeking. Thus, the present studies 
incorporated measures of information seeking to test whether the proposed 
mechanisms of choice set size preferences also contribute to age differences in 
information seeking. 
 
 Additional Factors Influencing Choice Set Size Preferences 
 To identify the driving forces behind age differences in choice set size 
preferences, the present research focused on self-efficacy, maximizing, and 
motivational priorities because previous research and/or theorizing suggested that 
these constructs are closely related to decision making (in some cases specifically 
  12 
related to choice set size preferences) and shift with age. I also examined secondary 
variables associated with decision making, aging, or the proposed mediators of age 
differences in choice set size preferences (i.e., DMSE, maximizing, and goal 
priorities). Some of these factors are directly linked to the primary constructs of 
DMSE, maximizing, and goal priorities: 
 Beliefs about choice. The hypothesized influence of self-efficacy on choice set 
size preferences assumes that people believe that added choice is associated with 
increased cognitive demands in decision-making. Similarly, the hypothesized 
influences of motivational priorities on choice set size preferences assume that 
individuals perceive increased choice to be detrimental to subjective decision quality. 
However, no prior studies have tested individuals’ beliefs about the consequences of 
increased choice or how these beliefs influence their choice set size preferences. The 
present research examined whether such beliefs are indeed related to choice set size 
preferences and age. 
 Future Time Perspective. Because motivational priorities are thought to shift 
across the life span as a function of future time perspective (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999), it is necessary to measure this construct in order to fully test 
hypotheses derived from socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 2006). 
However, it is important to note that advanced chronological age is not the only factor 
that limits future time perspective in adulthood. For instance, future time perspective 
constricts in adults of all ages as a function of real or imagined life events from 
geographical relocations to terminal illnesses, and such shifts are accompanied by 
corresponding changes in goal priorities (for a review, see Carstensen et al., 1999). 
Thus, it is important to consider and assess the role of future time perspective 
independent of age. 
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Other factors may influence choice set size preferences by elevating decision-
making competence, which should, extrapolating from self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 
1997), lead to increased DMSE. Thus, the following factors should be considered 
indirect (as opposed to direct) influences on choice set size preferences: 
  Preference clarity. Research by Chernev (2003) suggests that large choice sets 
may be disproportionately appealing to individuals whose attribute preferences for a 
given decision are highly accessible. For instance, one study by Chernev (2003) 
examined decisions among chocolates. Prior to making a choice, some participants 
indicated what their ideal chocolate would be with respect to attributes such as flavor 
and nut content. Participants who clearly articulated their preferences in this manner 
were significantly more likely to choose from larger versus smaller assortments 
(containing 16 options versus 4 options, respectively) than participants who did not 
articulate their preferences before choosing. This finding raises the possibility that age 
differences in choice set size preferences reflect a difference in preference 
accessibility between younger and older adults. However, this hypothesis remains 
purely speculative given the absence of prior research examining age differences in 
preference accessibility. To address this knowledge gap, the present research directly 
assessed preference accessibility in relation to choice set size preferences and age. 
  Need for cognition. The need for cognition (NFC), which refers to the 
tendency to “engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, p. 197), declines modestly with age (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
Because larger versus smaller choice sets pose greater information processing 
demands and are thus more cognitively challenging (Iyengar, 2010), it is plausible that 
individuals high in NFC would desire more choice. On the other hand, evidence of the 
relationship between NFC and decision making is equivocal at best (for a discussion, 
see Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). For instance, some studies found that high-NFC 
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individuals, compared to low-NFC, are relatively resistant to framing effects 
(Carnevale, Inbar, & Lerner, in press; Smith & Levin, 1996), whereas others found no 
relation between NFC and framing effects (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 
2007; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2003). Likewise, one study found that NFC was correlated 
with information seeking for multi-choice, multi-attribute judgments of consumer 
products (Verplanken, Hazenberg, & Palenewen, 1992), whereas another found no 
relationship between NFC and information seeking for related decisions (Verplanken, 
1993). Thus, evidence of the relationship between NFC and decision-making 
processes and outcomes appears at least partly dependent on the decision-making 
paradigm. For instance, as Stanovich and West (2008) point out, the association 
between NFC and framing effects varies across between- vs. within-subjects designs 
because within-subjects designs "signal that than issue of consistency is at stake" (p. 
689). That is, participants in within-subjects experiments perceive a need to be 
consistent in their choices, and this motivation suppresses the effects of individual 
difference characteristics, such as need for cognition, on decision making. 
On the other hand, studies using adult life-span samples have yielded 
consistent evidence linking NFC to overall decision-making competence across age 
groups (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010). Although prior 
research has not examined the relationship between NFC and choice set size 
preferences (let alone in the context of aging), it is possible that NFC might contribute 
to age differences in choice set size preferences. Based on this reasoning, the present 
studies included measures of NFC. 
Short-term memory. Recent studies have suggested that age differences in 
short-term memory contribute to reduced decision-making competence and relatively 
poorer decisions among older versus younger adults (Finucane & Gullion, 2010; 
Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010). Thus, insofar as short-term memory is 
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associated with age differences in the ability to make high quality decisions, it may 
well influence preferences for choice set sizes. 
Numeracy. Numeracy, the ability to interpret and process numerical 
information, has been identified as a key influence on decision-making (Nelson, 
Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). 
For instance, in a recent review of the literature on health numeracy, Reyna and 
colleagues (2009) concluded that low-numerate persons have deficits in interpreting 
graphical information, are more susceptible to the way in which probabilistic 
information is presented, and are more likely to fall prey to framing effects. However, 
the effects of numeracy on decision-making are not entirely consistent across (or even 
within) studies. For instance, while three studies by Peters et al. (2006) found that 
highly numerate individuals are less susceptible to decision-making biases (e.g., 
framing effects) and more likely to make optimal risky choices relative to low-
numerate individuals (Studies 1-3), a fourth study demonstrated an inverse 
relationship between numeracy and the quality of judgments regarding risky choices 
(Study 4). Subsequent research by the same authors found that the effects of numeracy 
on choice quality may depend on the structure of the decision, including how 
information is presented (Peters, Dieckmann, Dixon, Hibbard, & Mertz, 2007). 
As Reyna and colleagues (2009) acknowledge, research on the relationship 
between numeracy and effective decision making is hampered by broad and 
inconsistent definitions of numeracy, and the relationship itself is not fully understood. 
Nonetheless, some reasonable conclusions can be drawn. Insufficient numeracy, at 
least for health-related domains renders effective decision making an “elusive goal” 
(Reyna et al., 2009, p. 966) and “constrains informed patient choice” (Nelson et al., 
2008, p. 261). Moreover, as concluded by Peters et al. (2006), numeracy appears to 
improve decision quality in some situations, but impair it in others. 
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 Older adults suffer relative deficits in numeracy (Donelle, Hoffman-Goetz, & 
Arocha, 2007; Finucane & Gullion, 2010), and recent studies have demonstrated that, 
across adult age groups, numeracy predicts decision-making competence (Finucane & 
Gullion, 2010) and choice quality (i.e., for multi-choice, multi-attribute decisions 
(Tanius et al., 2009). Because age declines in numeracy have been linked to deficits in 
decision-making competence, it is plausible that developmental changes in the 
capacity to process decision-relevant numerical information contribute to observed age 
differences in choice set size preferences. 
 Finally, one additional factor may influence general decision making 
tendencies and, as an extension, choice set size preferences: 
   Personality. Previous research has indicated that personality traits may be 
correlated with decision-making preferences. For instance, conscientiousness and 
openness to experience are positively correlated with information seeking and desire 
for autonomy versus delegation (Flynn & Smith, 2007). Combined with evidence for 
age-related declines in openness throughout adulthood and declines in 
conscientiousness in later life (Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, & Costa, 2005), these 
findings suggest that personality may play a role in age differences in choice set size 
preferences. To investigate this possibility, the present research incorporated measures 
of personality traits. 
 
 Research Overview 
 To investigate the role of self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities 
in age differences in choice set size preferences, I conducted three studies using 
correlational and experimental methods. These studies were designed to examine the 
three primary factors simultaneously (Study 1) and in isolation from one another 
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(Studies 2a-c, Study 3). Combined, these studies provide a comprehensive portrait of 
multiple influences on choice set size preferences across the adult life span. 
 Study 1 (Chapter 2) examined associations between choice set size preferences 
and various decision-related constructs across adulthood using a large-scale survey 
design. One important aim of this study was to examine the trajectory of choice set 
size preferences across the adult life span, especially in light of the inconsistent results 
of prior research in this area. For instance, while one study found evidence of a linear 
relationship between age and preferences for smaller versus larger choice sets (Rozin 
et al., 2006), results of another study suggested a curvilinear relationship in which the 
desire for choices peaks in mid-life (Levinson et al., 2005). Importantly, neither of 
these studies examined multiple domains of choice preferences or used fine-grained 
measures of choice set size preferences, creating the need for additional research. 
Another primary goal of Study 1 was to examine the underlying mechanisms 
of age differences in choice set size preferences. As discussed above, age differences 
in choice set size preferences may reflect age differences in maximizing, decision-
making self-efficacy, or motivational priorities. Importantly, these factors do not 
necessarily operate independently, but may show meaningful associations with each 
other and with the additional factors discussed above. For instance, because 
maximizing is more challenging and requires greater information seeking than 
satisficing (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyengar, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2002), it is 
plausible that maximizers have relatively high decision-making self-efficacy and need 
for cognition, prioritize information-seeking goals, and perceive their future time 
horizons as expansive. In a similar vein, satisficers may have lower levels of self-
efficacy and need for cognition, prioritize emotion-regulatory goals, and perceive their 
future time horizons as limited, given that satisficing is a relatively less challenging 
but more satisfying strategy (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyengar, 2010; Schwartz et al., 
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2002). Study 1 was designed to reveal such associations by examining the relations 
among self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities and their links with age 
and choice set size preferences, as well as various covariates. 
 Chapter Three reports three laboratory-based studies which built upon the 
descriptive, correlational results of Study 1 and elucidated the specific effects of self-
efficacy (Study 2a), maximizing (Study 2b), and motivational priorities (Study 2c) on 
younger adults’ choice set size preferences and information seeking for consumer 
decisions. These studies included novel experimental manipulations of the three 
factors to isolate causal relations and rule out potential confounds. Although these 
studies did not explicitly address the question of developmental influences, they 
helped clarify the basic mechanisms behind choice set size preferences and provided 
the foundation for a ‘capstone’ study incorporating age comparisons. 
 Chapter Four reports a quasi-experimental life-span developmental study 
(Study 3) that examined whether manipulating self-efficacy in younger and older 
adults would alter age differences in choice set size preferences for consumer 
decisions. In this study both young and older adults received the same experimental 
manipulations of decision-making self-efficacy used in Study 2a before completing a 
decision task similar to that of Studies 2a-2c. By synthesizing the experimental design 
and manipulation of Study 2a with a cross-sectional age comparison (i.e., young 
versus older adults), Study 3 provided insight into the effects of decision-making self-
efficacy across age groups. In addition to extending the results of Study 2a to older 
adults, this study represents the first known attempt to systematically alter age 
differences in choice set size preferences. 
 Chapter Five discusses conclusions with respect to driving factors behind age 
differences in choice set size preferences, directions for future research, and 
implications for research on aging and decision-making as well as public policy.
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CHAPTER TWO: CORRELATES OF CHOICE SET SIZE PREFERENCES IN A 
LIFE-SPAN SAMPLE 
 
 A large-scale survey (Study 1) was conducted to examine the age trajectory of 
choice set size preferences and provide a comprehensive assessment of the role of 
DMSE, maximizing, and motivational priorities in choice set size preferences across 
the adult life span. Additional theoretically implicated covariates were included to 
examine their relative association with choice set size preferences and DMSE, 
maximizing, and motivational priorities. 
 Participants completed an internet-based questionnaire containing novel 
measures of choice set size preferences, DMSE, motivational priorities (information-
seeking vs. emotion-regulation), beliefs about choice, and preference clarity. In 
addition, participants completed existing measures of maximizing, need for cognition, 
personality traits, future time perspective, and cognitive and numerical abilities.  
 Conducting the survey via the internet afforded a larger and more diverse sample 
than could be obtained through traditional on-site testing (Mikels et al., 2009; Reed et 
al., 2008). Importantly, we also recruited a sample of in-person participants to anchor 
the internet-based data. 
 Participants were asked how many options they preferred in a wide variety of 
decision domains. To expand upon previous research on choice set size preferences 
(Reed et al., 2008; Rozin et al., 2006), the domains in the present study ranged from 
everyday choices among cellular phones and restaurants to consequential health-
related decisions among physicians and prescription drug plans. 
 The following hypotheses were tested in Study 1: 
H1: Choice set size preferences are negatively correlated with age. 
H2: Choice set size preferences are positively correlated with decision-
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making self-efficacy, maximizing, and information-seeking goals, and 
negatively correlated with emotion-regulatory goals. 
H3: Decision-making self-efficacy, maximizing, and information-
seeking goals are negatively associated with age, and emotion-
regulatory goals are positively associated with age. 
H4: Age differences in choice set size preferences are mediated by age 
differences in self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities. 
 Beyond testing these core hypotheses, Study 1 also provided an exploratory 
investigation of the role of the additional covariates listed above. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Three hundred and thirty adults aged 18-90 (M = 47.5 years) participated in 
exchange for monetary compensation or course credit2. Of these, 194 participants 
(aged 19-87, 64% female) were recruited from across the U.S. and completed the 
survey remotely via the internet (presumably from their home computers). Because the 
remote participants completed the survey in an uncontrolled testing environment, I 
also recruited a comparison sample of 136 participants (aged 18-90, 71% female) from 
the Ithaca, N.Y. community, including 34 undergraduate students and 102 community-
dwelling individuals. These participants completed the survey in a private testing 
room in the Healthy Aging Laboratory of Cornell University. Additional participant 
characteristics are presented in Table 1 below. As illustrated below, the remote and 
                                                
2 To safeguard against fraudulent or unreliable responses, participant data (n =  21) were excluded if 
they indicated an unusually brief completion time (i.e., less than 20 minutes) and/or numerous 
responses from the same computer (based on identical IP addresses). The sample characteristics 
reported above are for the final sample (N = 330). 
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on-site samples did not differ significantly in terms of age, sex, or racial/ethnic 
composition, although the remote sample reported relatively higher socioeconomic 
status and was better educated than the on-site sample. 
 
 Measures 
 All participants completed a computerized survey containing a demographics 
form (including age, sex, education level, and socioeconomic status) and the following 
measures: 
 Choice Set Size Preferences. Adapted from the choice preference measure 
developed by Reed and colleagues (2008), this self-report measure asks participants 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics in Study 1 
   
Measure Overall (N = 330) 
Remote 
Sample  
(N = 194) 
On-Site 
Sample 
(N = 136) t X2 
Age (years), M 
(SD) 
47.5 
(21.4) 
47.3  
(18.4) 
47.8  
(24.9) -.18  
Age range (years) 18-90 19-87 18-90   
Socioeconomic 
Status 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.39
*  
Education (Years) 16.3 16.8 15.5 4.48***  
Sex (% female) 67.3% 63.9% 71.2% 
	  
4.53 
Hispanic (%) 4.2% 4.1% 4.4%  .72 
Race (%)     4.16 
Caucasian 89.4% 89.7% 89.0%   
Asian or Pacific   
Islander 6.1% 7.2% 4.4%   
African 
American 2.4% 1.5% 3.6%   
Other 2.1% 1.6% 3.0%   
Note. Socioeconomic status was obtained via self-reports on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (from 1 - Lower Income to 5 - Upper Income). 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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how many choices they would prefer when making decisions across a variety of 
domains. The choice domains are divided evenly between 6 everyday decisions 
(apartments, vacations, restaurants, cars, cellular phones, and jams) and 6 healthcare 
decisions (hospitals, health insurance plans, physicians, hearing aids, prescription drug 
plans, and nursing homes). Participants indicated the desired number of options in 
each domain using a forced-choice scale containing choice sets from 2 to 30 options 
(in increments of 4). The choice set size preferences measure showed high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .93) and responses were averaged into a composite 
measure. 
 Self-Efficacy. Two separate measures were used to assess decision-making self-
efficacy (DMSE). One measured DMSE across various components of decision-
making (Component-Based DMSE), and the other measured decision-making self-
efficacy across various choice domains (Domain-Based DMSE). 
 The Component-Based DMSE measure is a novel measure consisting of 12 
items gauging confidence in one’s ability to successfully complete various 
theoretically implicated components of decision-making competence (Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2007; Finucane et al., 2002). As depicted in Appendix A, these items range from 
comprehension and memory of choice-related information to strategy selection (e.g., 
“When you are making decisions among different options, how confident are you that 
you can choose the most effective decision strategy?”). Participants respond to each 
statement using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 1 - not at all confident to 7 - 
extremely confident). The Component-Based DMSE measure showed high internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .93) and responses were averaged into a composite 
measure. 
 The Domain-Based DMSE measure was adapted from the healthcare self-
efficacy scale developed by Löckenhoff and Carstensen (2007). It assesses confidence 
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in one’s ability to select the best alternative when making decisions across a variety of 
everyday and healthcare domains (see choice set size preferences measure for list of 
domains). Participants reported their self-efficacy for each domain on a 7-point Likert-
type scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident). The Domain-DMSE 
measure demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) and 
responses were averaged into a composite measure. 
 In order to differentiate the role of decision-making self-efficacy from other 
types of self-efficacy, I also measured participants’ memory self-efficacy using the 
Capacity subscale of the Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (Dixon & Hultsch, 
1983). The MIA-Capacity scale consists of 17 statements regarding one’s ability to 
remember a variety of everyday information (e.g., “I am good at remembering things 
like recipes”). Responses are provided on a 5-point Likert-type scale (from 1 - agree 
strongly to 5 - disagree strongly). The MIA-Capacity scale showed acceptable internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .82). 
 Maximizing versus Satisficing. Participants completed the Maximization Scale 
(Schwartz et al., 2002), a self-report measure of the extent to which individuals seek 
the best possible alternative when making decisions (i.e., maximize) versus settle for 
options which are “good enough” (i.e., satisfice). The scale consists of 13 statements 
describing decision-making habits and values (e.g., “I never settle for second best”), to 
which participants respond using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 1 - completely 
disagree to 7 - completely agree). Prior research indicated moderate test-retest 
reliability (rs > .7) for the Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002). The 
Maximization Scale showed modest internal consistency in the present study 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .70). 
 Motivational Priorities. To test the extent to which choice set size preferences 
are associated with age differences in motivational priorities (i.e., a shift from 
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prioritizing information-seeking in youth to emotion-regulation in later life), I 
administered a novel measure of motivational priorities in decision-making (MP-DM; 
see Appendix B). The MP-DM scale was loosely adapted from a measure of social 
goals developed by Lang and Carstensen (2002). It consists of 10 items gauging the 
extent to which people are motivated to pursue emotion-regulatory goals (e.g., “When 
making decisions, how important is it for you to avoid feeling regret?”) versus 
information-seeking goals (e.g., “When making decisions, how important is it for you 
to seek as much information as possible before choosing?”). Participants rate the 
importance of each goal using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 1 - not at all important 
to 7 - very important). The emotion-regulatory items showed modest internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .75) and the information-seeking items showed 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .86). However, the information-
seeking and emotion-regulatory goals subscales, which were designed to measure 
independent constructs, were interrelated (Spearman’s ρ = .50, p < .01)3. 
 Beliefs About Choice. To assess participants’ beliefs regarding the potential costs 
and benefits of more versus less choice, I developed the novel Beliefs About Choice 
scale (BAC). As depicted in Appendix C, the BAC contains 8 statements regarding the 
consequences of choice with respect to affective and cognitive aspects of the decision 
process and outcome. Participants reported their level of agreement to each statement 
using a 7-point Likert-type scale (from 1 - strongly disagree to 7 - strongly agree). 
Responses to the BAC scale were coded such that higher scores indicate more positive 
beliefs about choice. The BAC scale showed acceptable internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and responses were averaged into a composite measure. In 
                                                
3 Supplemental analyses using factor scores (from a forced two-factor solution with varimax rotation) in 
place of summary (average) scores for the information-seeking and emotion-regulation subscales 
yielded the same pattern of results. In addition, when motivational priorities were calculated in terms of 
a difference score (i.e., by subtracting information-seeking from emotion-regulation) they were also not 
related to choice set size preferences. 
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addition to the BAC items, I also administered a single-item measure of the extent to 
which individuals believe, consistent with rational choice models, that larger versus 
smaller choice sets are more likely to contain the optimal alternative (labeled below as 
“Rational Choice Belief”). Participants responded to this item using a 7-point Likert-
type scale (from 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree). This item was analyzed 
separately from the BAC (see below). 
 Preference Clarity. A novel measure of preference clarity was administered. For 
each domain listed in the choice set size preferences measure, participants were asked 
to report the 3 most important attributes (e.g., for decisions among restaurants: a 
relaxing atmosphere, fast service, and a wide variety of entrees). To measure the 
accessibility of these preferences, participants were then asked to rate how easy it was 
to think of these factors on a 7-point scale (1 - very difficult to 7 - very easy). The 
factor-listing and accessibility ratings were repeated for all 12 decision domains. 
Internal consistency for accessibility ratings was moderate (Cronbach’s alpha = .86). 
Thus, all ratings were averaged into a composite measure of preference clarity. 
 Personality. Personality traits were measured via the 10-item version of the Big 
Five Inventory (Rammstedt & John, 2007), which is recommended as a brief measure 
of the five-factor model personality dimensions (neuroticism, extraversion, openness 
to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness). Each dimension is assessed by 2 
statements regarding self-rated traits (e.g., “I see myself as someone who tends to be 
lazy”). Participants respond using a 5-point Likert-type agreement scale (from 1 - 
disagree strongly to 5 - agree strongly). The BFI-10 possesses a clear factor structure 
with good discriminant validity and test-retest stability, as well as strong convergent 
validity with respect to extended personality measures (Rammstedt & John, 2007). 
Correlation coefficients for pairs of items ranged from r = .24 (Openness) to r = .53 
(Extraversion), all ps < .01. 
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 Need for Cognition. Need for cognition was measured using the NFC subscale 
of the 10-item version of the Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
The NFC subscale, which is directly adapted from the short-form NFC measure 
developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984), uses 5 statements to measure self-
rated enjoyment and engagement in effortful deliberative processing (e.g., “I prefer to 
do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that requires 
little thought.”). Participants report their agreement to each statement on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (1 - definitely false to 5 - definitely true). Psychometric analyses 
have established high internal validity for the NFC subscale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
and it showed acceptable internal consistency in the present sample (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .78). 
 Future Time Perspective. To measure future time perspective, I administered the 
FTP scale developed by Lang and Carstensen (2002). The FTP scale consists of 10 
statements reflecting a limited time perspective (e.g., “I have the sense that time is 
running out”) versus open-ended time perspective (e.g., “Most of my life still lies 
ahead of me”). Participants respond using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 - very untrue 
to 7 - very true). The FTP scale showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.91). 
 Short-term memory. I measured short-term memory using a computerized 
version of the forward subtest of the Digit Span test (Wechsler, 1997). In the Digit 
Span test, participants viewed a series of increasingly long number strings which they 
had to “repeat” by typing. 
 Numeracy was measured using the 11-item Numeracy Scale developed by 
Lipkus and colleagues (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001), which contains a series of 
questions for which the correct answer requires accurate interpretation of probabilistic 
information. 
  27 
 Vocabulary was measured using the subtest of the Shipley Vocabulary Test 
(Zachary, 1986), which asks participants to select synonyms (from a list of 4 options) 
for 25 terms of varying difficulty.  
 
Procedure 
 After providing informed consent, participants completed a computerized survey 
containing the following measures in order: Demographics, choice set size 
preferences, domain DMSE, component DMSE, memory self-efficacy, motivational 
priorities, future time perspective, maximizing, need for cognition, personality, beliefs 
about choice, preference clarity, numeracy, vocabulary, and working memory. 
Completion of the entire survey took approximately 45-60 minutes. 
 
Results 
 No significant differences were observed in the pattern of results between 
participants who completed the survey remotely versus on-site. Consequently, all 
reported analyses collapse both participant groups into a combined sample. In 
addition, no significant associations were observed between choice set size 
preferences and any of the demographic variables, so demographic variables will not 
be discussed further. 
 Exploratory data analyses indicated that many of the dependent measures, 
including choice set size preferences, were not normally distributed. Consequently, 
data were analyzed using non-parametric tests when appropriate. 
 Table 2 depicts the non-parametric correlations (Spearman’s ρ) among age, 
choice set size preferences, the three proposed mediators, and additional covariates in 
Study 1. 
 My first hypothesis, that choice set size preferences would be negatively 
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correlated with age, was supported. As depicted in Figure 1 below, there was an 
inverse association between age and preferred choice set size (Spearman’s ρ = -.25, p 
< .05). Subsequent regression analyses indicated that neither the quadratic nor cubic 
effects of age were significant. The negative correlation between age and choice set 
size preferences was significant for all domains except for jam varieties (Spearman’s ρ 
= -.03, n.s.). Post-hoc analyses indicated that middle-aged participants desired 
significantly more choices among varieties of jam (M = 10.5, SD = 8.1) than older (M 
= 8.4, SD = 6.7) but not younger participants (M = 9.7, SD = 8.4). For all other 
domains, correlations between age and choice set size preferences ranged in size from 
ρ = -.12 (vacations) to ρ = -.33 (physicians) and were all significant (all ps < .05). 
Thus, the association between age and choice set size preferences appears to be linear 
and generalizable across domains. 
 My second hypothesis was that maximizing, DMSE, and information-seeking 
would be positively correlated with choice set size preferences. As depicted in Table 
2, only maximizing was associated with choice set size preferences (Spearman’s ρ = 
.11, p < .05). Choice set size preferences were also associated with the composite 
measure of beliefs about choice4 (Spearman’s ρ = .13, p < .05), future time perspective 
(Spearman’s ρ = .17, p < .01), and vocabulary (Spearman’s ρ = -.14, p < .01). Thus, 
participants who desired more versus less choice reported greater maximizing, held 
more positive beliefs about increased choice, and had more expansive future time 
perspectives and smaller vocabularies. 
                                                
4 Item-level analyses indicated that choice set size preferences were only correlated with items 3 (“more 
motivated”) and 4 (“more confident”). 
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Table 2. Intercorrelations (Spearman’s ρ) among age and dependent measures in 
Study 1. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Core Variables        
1. Age --       
2. Preferred Choice Set Size -.29** --      
3. Component-Based DMSE .06 -.04 --     
4. Domain-Based DMSE .11* .00 .55** --    
5. Maximization -.47** .11* -.20** -.10 --   
6. Emotion-Regulation Goals -.21** .03 .21** .25** .27** --  
7. Information-Seeking Goals .01 .05 .47** .34** .13* .50** -- 
Additional Covariates        
8. Memory Self-Efficacy -.19** .03 .42** .30** .01 .27** .33** 
9. Beliefs About Choice .25** .13* .19** .10 -.02 .01 .24** 
10. Rational Choice Belief -.09 .19** .19** .12* .09 .13* .20** 
11. Preference Accessibility .39** -.04 .36** .39** -.27** .01 .17** 
12. Neuroticism -.13* .00 -.22** -.12* .19** .21** .07 
13. Extraversion .04 -.04 .09 .00 -.13* -.06 .00 
14. Openness -.03 .03 .05 .10 -.02 .17** .17** 
15. Agreeableness .06 .07 .11 .11* -.18** .00 .04 
16. Conscientiousness .16** -.03 .23** .08 -.18** .08 .21** 
17. Need for Cognition .04 .03 .32** .15** -.14** .05 .25** 
18. Future Time Perspective -.54** .17** .21** .14** .21** .14** .07 
19. Digit Span -.24** .06 .11 -.02 .10 .06 .03 
20. Numeracy -.21** .07 .04 -.05 .08 -.02 -.02 
21. Vocabulary .47** -.14** .10 .06 -.26** -.12* -.03 
Note. DMSE = Decision-Making Self-Efficacy; N = 330. 
**p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot of preferred choice set size by age in Study 1. 
Note. Fit line represents linear regression equation (R2 = .064). 
 
 My third hypothesis was that age would be inversely associated with DMSE, 
maximizing, and information-seeking goals, and positively associated with emotion-
regulation goals. As depicted in Table 2, age was indeed negatively correlated with 
maximizing (Spearman’s ρ = -.47, p < .01). However, age was positively correlated 
with the domain-based measure of DMSE5 (Spearman’s ρ = .11, p < .05), negatively 
                                                
5 Item-level analyses indicated the age was positively correlated with self-efficacy for all health-related 
domains (Spearman’s ρs > .13, ps < .05) with the following exceptions: Age was only marginally 
correlated with self-efficacy for nursing homes (Spearman’s ρ = .10, p < .09) and was not significantly 
correlated with self-efficacy for hospitals (Spearman’s ρ = .06, n.s.). Among the everyday domains, age 
was positively correlated with efficacy for varieties of jam (Spearman’s ρ = .12, p < .05), negatively 
correlated with efficacy for cellular phones (Spearman’s ρ = -.25, p < .001), and not significantly 
correlated with efficacy for any other domains. 
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correlated with emotion-regulation goals (Spearman’s ρ = -.21, p < .01), and unrelated 
to information-seeking goals (Spearman’s ρ = .01, n.s.). Thus, older versus younger 
adults reported less maximizing tendencies but had somewhat higher levels of domain 
DMSE and reported reduced emotion-regulatory motivations. 
 My fourth hypothesis was that the age differences in choice set size preferences 
would be mediated by age differences in self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational 
priorities. To test this hypothesis, I conducted mediation analyses6 (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) using age as the initial variable (X), choice set size preferences as the outcome 
variable (Y) and self-efficacy, maximizing, and information-seeking goals as the 
mediating variables (M1, M2, and M3, respectively). In Step 1 of the analysis, the 
direct path (c) between age and choice set size preferences was significant (β = -.24, p 
< .01). In Step 2 of the analysis, however, the only proposed mediator which was 
significantly correlated with the initial variable of age was maximizing (β = -.46, p < 
.001), which rules out the possibility of the other variables serving as mediators. In 
Step 3 of the analysis, maximizing did not significantly predict choice set size 
preferences (β = .01, n.s.) when entered into a regression along with age, suggesting 
that maximizing did not mediate age differences in choice set size preferences. Thus, 
there was no support for any of the hypothesized mediators of age differences in 
choice set size preferences. 
 Only two variables, future time perspective and vocabulary, were significantly 
associated with both age and choice set size preferences in a manner that implicated 
them as a possible mediators. Consequently, additional mediation analyses (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986) were conducted in the same manner as described above. As in the 
previous analyses, age and choice set size were significantly and positively correlated 
                                                
6 Mediation analyses using a non-parametric bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) yielded 
similar patterns of results. For the sake of parsimony, I only report results for the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) analyses. 
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(β = -.24, p < .01) in Step 1. In Step 2 of the analyses, age was significantly and 
negatively correlated with future time perspective (β = -.52, p < .001) and positively 
correlated with vocabulary scores (β = .42, p < .001). In Step 3, vocabulary scores (β = 
-.14, p < .05) remained predictive of choice set size preferences, but future time 
perspective was no longer predictive (β = .01, n.s.), when age was included in the 
regression. However, age remained a significant predictor of choice set size 
preferences after including vocabulary and future time perspective in the regression 
equations (βs < -.19, ps < .005). Sobel tests (Sobel, 1982) confirmed that future time 
perspective did not mediate (z = -.10, n.s.), but vocabulary partially mediated age 
differences in choice set size preferences (z = -2.20, p < .05). However, vocabulary 
only accounted for 1.5% of variance in choice set size preferences above and beyond 
age, suggesting that it played a minimal role in age differences. 
 A number of secondary findings are noteworthy. First, the proposed mediators 
(self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities) were interrelated, though not 
in the expected manner. Both measures of decision-making self-efficacy were 
positively correlated with information-seeking and emotion-regulatory goals 
(Spearman’s ρs ≥ .21, ps < .01). Maximizing was negatively correlated with 
component-based DMSE (Spearman’s ρ = -.20, p < .05) and positively correlated with 
information-seeking goals (Spearman’s ρ = .13, p < .05) and emotion-regulatory goals 
(Spearman’s ρ = .27, p < .01). 
 The novel measures of decision-making self-efficacy demonstrated acceptable 
psychometric properties. For instance, both measures of self-efficacy (component-
based and domain-based) were correlated with each other (Spearman’s ρ = .55, p < 
.01) and with the measure of memory self-efficacy (Spearman’s ρ ≥ .30, ps < .01). As 
depicted in Table 2, the component-based DMSE measure also converged with 
measures of preference accessibility, need for cognition, and conscientiousness. 
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 Additional psychometric properties of the motivational priorities measure, 
however, were problematic. As expected, the emotion-regulation goals subscale was 
positively correlated with future time perspective (Spearman’s ρ = .14, p < .05). 
However, contrary to my expectations, the emotion-regulation and information-
seeking subscales were interrelated, as previously discussed. 
 Further, age was associated with more positive beliefs about choice7 
(Spearman’s ρ  = .25, p < .01), higher preference accessibility8 (Spearman’s ρ = .39, p 
< .01), and decreased memory self-efficacy (Spearman’s ρ = -.19, p < .01), though the 
latter two constructs were not significantly associated with choice set size preferences. 
Thus, older versus younger adults held more favorable views of larger choice sets and 
clearer decision-related preferences, despite reduced confidence in their memory 
capacities. Age was not associated with the “Rational Choice Belief” (i.e., that larger 
choice sets are more likely to contain optimal alternatives; Spearman’s ρ = -.09, p > 
.12), although the belief was positively correlated with choice set size preferences 
(Spearman’s ρ = .19, p < .005).  
 Finally, age differences in personality traits and cognition were consistent with 
prior research. Older versus younger participants reported reduced levels of 
neuroticism but increased agreeableness and conscientiousness, as depicted in Table 2. 
Age was also associated with decreased performance on the Digit Span and Numeracy 
tests, but these variables showed no significant associations with choice set size 
preferences. 
 
                                                
7 Item-level analyses indicated significant positive correlations between age and responses to all items 
in the BAC measure except for Items 3 (“more motivated”) and 8 (“more satisfied”). 
8 Domain-level analyses indicated that preference accessibility was positively and significantly 
correlated with age for all domains (Spearman’s ρs > .12, ps < .05) with the exception of restaurants, 
for which the age-accessibility correlation was positive but only marginally significant (Spearman’s ρ = 
.10, p < .07). 
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Discussion 
 As predicted, age was negatively associated with choice set size preferences for 
nearly all choice domains across the life-span sample, and maximizing was negatively 
associated with age and positively correlated with choice set size preferences. 
However, support for other hypotheses was mixed. In contrast to my predictions, 
domain-based DMSE was positively associated with age, and emotion-regulation 
goals were inversely related to age, contrary to socioemotional selectivity theory 
(Carstensen, 2006). Information-seeking goals were uncorrelated with age. Moreover, 
there was only limited evidence of the predicted relationships among DMSE, 
maximizing, motivational priorities, and choice set size preferences. Neither the 
proposed mediators nor any of the other variables included in the study could fully 
account for age differences in choice set size preferences. Although vocabulary scores 
emerged as a partial mediator, they only accounted for an insignificant portion of the 
variance in choice set size preferences. 
 There are several potential interpretations for the lack of significant mediation 
results in the present study. First, it may be the case that the driving factors behind 
choice set size preferences are not accessible to conscious thought or insight, and 
therefore ill-suited to measurement via self-report. This interpretation is buttressed by 
mounting evidence that unconscious, automatic, and/or intuitive processes play a 
significant role in decision-making (Simonson, 2005). Future research needs to 
examine the role of such factors in preferences for choice set sizes. Alternatively, it is 
possible that cohort effects—as opposed to age-related changes—contributed to the 
observed age differences in choice set size preferences. Because the proliferation of 
choice is a relatively recent historical phenomenon (Schwartz, 2004), it is plausible 
that older adults, relative to younger adults, may be more accustomed to limited choice 
sets. 
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 Despite the lack of support for the hypothesized mediators, the present results 
are useful in a number of ways. For one, they represent the first systematic, life-span 
examination of age differences in choice set size preferences across a variety of 
domains. Previous studies in this area only compared choice set size preferences at the 
extreme ends of the adult life span (Reed et al., 2008), or were restricted to a single 
choice domain (Rozin et al., 2006). By contrast, the present study includes a true life-
span sample and a wide variety of choice domains. Results suggest that choice set size 
preferences decrease in a gradual, linear manner over the course of adulthood, and that 
this trend extends to many choice domains. In addition, the present study provides 
novel evidence of previously unexamined aspects of age differences in decision 
making: Specifically, older adults reported more positive beliefs of the consequences 
of large choice sets and easier access to their decision preferences. 
 Consistent with previous research, the present results suggest that maximizers 
prefer more choice relative to satisficers (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009) and that older 
adults are less likely to maximize than younger adults (Tanius et al., 2009). However, 
maximizing was not found to mediate the relationship between age and choice set size 
preferences. One possible explanation for the lack of mediation is the small effect size 
for the relationship between maximizing and choice set size preferences (Spearman’s 
ρ = .11, p < .05). Because the present study elicited choice set size preferences in a 
hypothetical and relatively abstract manner—one that provided no incentive to 
maximizers for selecting the largest choice set—the effect of maximizing may have 
been diluted. Thus, research using behavioral measures of choice set size preferences 
in decision contexts with real consequences may be more likely to capture the 
hypothesized mediation of age differences. 
 In contrast to previous research, the present results indicated that information-
seeking goals were unrelated to chronological age, and emotion-regulatory goals were 
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inversely associated with age. Both results represent failures to replicate findings by 
Lang and Carstensen (2002), who found that when adults of different ages are asked to 
rank the importance of various social motivations (i.e., via a card-sort task), older 
adults prioritize emotion regulatory goals (e.g., controlling one’s feelings) versus 
information-related goals (e.g., being knowledgeable) to a greater extent than younger 
adults. Lang and Carstensen also found that the age differences in goal priorities were 
mediated by future time perspective. By contrast, in the present study self-reported 
motivational priorities in the context of decision making (emotion regulation versus 
information-seeking) were not significantly related to future time perspective. The 
most likely explanation for this finding is that the novel measure used in the present 
study did not accurately measure the construct of emotional versus information goals 
with respect to decision making. This interpretation is further supported by the 
significant and counter-intuitive correlation between the emotion-regulation and 
information-seeking subscales. Future studies should incorporate measure of goal 
priorities with sound psychometric properties. 
 Although my hypotheses focused on factors that might limit choice set size 
preferences with age, the present findings suggest one factor that should promote the 
desire for larger choice sets with age: Older adults, relative to younger adults, reported 
more positive views of the consequences of choice. However, although positive views 
of choice were associated with increased choice set size preferences in the sample as a 
whole, older adults nonetheless desired less choice than younger adults. In other 
words, older participants wanted fewer options despite harboring beliefs that more 
options are better. The most likely explanation for this apparent paradox stems from 
the item-level analyses discussed in Footnotes 3 and 7 above: Choice set size 
preferences were only associated with two of the eight items in the BAC, and of these, 
only one was significantly associated with age. 
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 These results are also consistent with the notion that older versus younger adults 
harbor divergent beliefs about what constitutes “more” choice in decision making. For 
instance, older adults may have reported relatively more positive beliefs about choice 
because they were considering differences between relatively small choice sets (e.g., 2 
versus 6 options), whereas younger adults may have reported less positive views 
because they were considering relatively larger choice sets (e.g., 10 versus 20 
options). If conceptions of increased choice indeed vary with age, future studies 
should measure beliefs about choice while explicitly defining increased choice (e.g., 
choosing among 6 versus 24 options). 
 It should be acknowledged that the present study found a small effect size for the 
relationship between age and choice set size preferences (Spearman’s ρ = -.29, p < 
.01), whereas previous studies reported medium effect sizes (Reed et al., 2008; Rozin 
et al., 2006). The discrepancy in effect sizes may be due to the use of extreme age 
groups (Reed et al., 2008) or response formats (Rozin et al., 2006) in previous 
research. Alternatively, the use of a partially internet-based sample in the present 
study may have introduced additional noise to the data set, given the uncontrolled 
nature of remote testing environments. Because age differences observed in the 
present data (i.e., with respect to FTP, maximizing, personality, and cognitive 
abilities) are consistent with previous research, the explanation of low data quality is 
unlikely. Nonetheless, replicating the findings in fully controlled testing environments 
is recommended. 
 Overall, the results of this study suggest that the factors that drive choice set size 
preferences are somewhat elusive. Because correlates of choice set size preferences 
are few in number and weak in effect size, using a correlational approach may not be 
the ideal means of investigating age effects. At the same time, while the results of 
Study 1 suggest that self-efficacy and motivational priorities are uncorrelated with 
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choice set size preferences at the level of self-reports, they do not speak to the 
question of causality—nor do they necessarily extend to behavioral measures of 
choice set size preferences. In the following chapter, I discuss a series of laboratory-
based experiments designed to address these limitations and provide additional insight 
into the mechanisms underlying choice set size preferences. 
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CHAPTER THREE: POTENTIAL MECHANISMS OF CHOICE SET SIZE 
PREFERENCES 
 Whereas Study 1 used a correlational approach to examine the relationship 
between choice set size preferences and DMSE, maximizing, and motivational 
priorities, the studies reported in this chapter (Studies 2a-2c) used experimental 
manipulations to isolate the influence of each factor on choice set size preferences. For 
this purpose, I developed novel experimental manipulations of DMSE (Study 2a) and 
maximizing (Study 2b), and utilized an established manipulation of motivational 
priorities (Study 2c). Moreover, instead of relying on self-report measures of choice 
set size preferences, Studies 2a-2c implemented an incentive-compatible behavioral 
decision task (i.e., involving real outcomes), which also allowed for the assessment of 
information seeking in addition to choice set size preferences. Finally, to minimize the 
effects of age-related confounds, Studies 2a-2c focused on a single age group, namely 
younger adults. 
In Studies 2a-2c, undergraduate students made decisions among photo printers 
with the expectation that they would be entered into a lottery for which the winner 
would receive the printer of his or her choice. This decision domain was selected 
because pilot testing suggested that it was moderately familiar to undergraduates and 
few students already owned photo printers. Prior to making their decision, participants 
were exposed to experimental manipulations of decision-making self-efficacy (high 
versus low; Study 2a), maximizing versus satisficing (Study 2b), or motivational 
priorities (information-seeking versus emotion-regulation; Study 2c). It was predicted 
that choice set size preferences and information seeking would be increased by 
experimental inductions of high (versus low) self-efficacy, maximizing (versus 
satisficing), and information-seeking goals (versus emotion-regulatory goals). 
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Study 2a: Decision-making self-efficacy and choice set size preferences 
 Study 2a was designed to isolate the influence of decision-making self-efficacy 
on choice set size preferences and information seeking. Although DMSE was not 
related to choice set size preferences in Study 1, its effects may have been obscured by 
the self-report method and/or correlational design. In Study 2a, participants were given 
false feedback to elevate or suppress their DMSE levels prior to making a decision 
among photo printers. Based on the tenets of self-efficacy theory and prior research on 
decision-making self-efficacy (Bandura & Wood, 1989; Tabernero & Wood, 2009), I 
hypothesized that individuals whose self-efficacy levels were experimentally elevated 
would desire more choice and seek more information relative to those individuals 
whose efficacy levels were reduced. I also administered background measures related 
to decision making, including maximizing (Schwartz et al., 2002) and personality 
traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992). These served to justify the false-feedback 
manipulation to participants and were included as covariates in data analyses. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-five undergraduate students (74% female, aged 18-26, M = 19.98 years) 
participated in exchange for course credit. Eleven participants were excluded from 
data analyses because they failed to comply with instructions and/or expressed 
suspicion regarding the experimental manipulation upon debriefing (final N = 54)9. 
 
Measures 
 As part of the experimental manipulation, all participants completed a battery 
of background measures under the premise that their responses to the measures would 
                                                
9 Exclusion of these participants did not significantly influence the pattern of reported results. 
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help to determine how easy or difficult the subsequent decision task would be. These 
measures included the following: 
 To measure self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities in decision 
making, I administered the Component-Based DMSE, Maximization (Schwartz et al., 
2002), and Motivational Priorities in Decision-Making scales, respectively (see Study 
1 for details). 
To measure personality traits, I administered the NEO Five-Factor Inventory 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992), which assesses neuroticism, extraversion, openness to 
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The NEO-FFI contains 60 items 
divided evenly among the 5 personality factors, possesses a validated factor structure, 
and is recommended for broad measurement of personality factors (McCrae & Costa, 
2007). 
 Self-Efficacy Manipulation Check. Consistent with guidelines for assessing 
self-efficacy recommended by Bandura (2006), participants indicated how confident 
they were in their ability to select the best possible photo printer on a scale from 0% 
(not at all confident) to 100% (very confident). This measure, used as a manipulation 
check, was administered at two separate times during the experiment (see procedure 
for details). 
 
Materials 
 Information Sheet. Prior to making the decision, each participant was given an 
information sheet providing details about the decision attributes. This helped to 
address any interindividual differences in background knowledge of photo printers, 
and ensured that all participants were able to make an informed decision among the 
printers. The information sheet was modeled after information provided by consumer 
recommendation sources (e.g., Consumer Reports and Amazon.com) and contained 
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explanations for each of the decision attributes. For instance, the explanation for the 
feed capacity attribute contained the following information: “The feed capacity is the 
maximum number of sheets of paper that can fit in the printer. The higher the feed 
capacity, the less often the printer paper will need to be refilled.” 
  Information Grid. All participants completed a decision among 20 photo 
printers using a standard computerized information grid, presented via E-Prime 2.0 
experimental software. The information grid contained real printer model names and 
information (retrieved from retailers’ and manufacturers’ websites) for the following 
six attributes: Black print resolution (DPI), color print resolution (DPI), feed capacity 
(i.e., maximum number of sheets of paper), maximum media size, memory card 
reader, and print noise level (dBA)10. Attributes were selected based on information 
commonly provided by consumer electronics websites. Pilot testing with 49 
undergraduate students confirmed that the attributes were judged as moderately 
important (memory card reader; M = 3.5, SD = 2.2) to very important (color print 
resolution; M = 5.8, SD = 1.1) on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 – not at all important 
to 7 – extremely important). As depicted in Figure 3, each piece of information was 
contained in a separate cell within the grid, and all information was initially hidden 
from participants, who were instructed to use the computer mouse to click on a cell to 
reveal the corresponding information. Each piece of information remained visible until 
the participant clicked on another cell, at which point the initial information would 
disappear. Thus, only one piece of information was visible at any time, though 
participants were allowed to revisit any cell. Participants were allowed to view as 
                                                
10 I deliberately chose to omit pricing information from the grid so that participants did not simply 
select the most expensive printer. For some printers it was not possible to obtain full information for all 
six attributes--in these cases the missing attribute was calculated as the mean attribute value for all other 
printers in the information grid. 
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much information as they desired, and were given unlimited time to search for 
information within the grid prior to selecting a printer. 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: High self-
efficacy, low self-efficacy, and control. At the onset of the experiment, all participants 
were informed that they would be making a decision among consumer photo printers. 
Additionally, they were instructed to treat this decision as real because one participant 
would be randomly selected via lottery to receive the printer of his or her choice at the 
end of the experiment. Prior to the decision, they were asked to complete the 
background measures described above in the following order: Component-Based 
DMSE, MP-DM, Maximization Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002), and NEO-FFI (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). Participants were informed that their responses would provide an 
indication of their ability to make the ensuing decision11. 
                                                
11A pilot study (N = 47) using a similar DMSE manipulation without the false feedback component 
proved unsuccessful. In the pilot study, participants were simply told that the decision task would be 
either easy (high DMSE) or difficult (low DMSE). Unlike in Study 2a, this information was not 
presented as based on personal responses, and may not have been sufficiently salient or believable. 
Consequently, the false feedback component was added to the present study to increase the effect of the 
manipulation. 
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Figure 2. Information grid used in Studies 2a-2c.  
Grid depicts open cell corresponding to Color Print Resolution for Canon iP3600 
printer. Only one cell was visible at a time.
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 Upon completion of the background measures, participants in the experimental 
conditions were presented with a screen stating that that the computer was currently 
analyzing their responses to the background measure. This screen, which lasted 
several seconds, was included to add legitimacy to the ensuing false feedback self-
efficacy manipulation. Participants in the experimental conditions were then informed 
that, based on their responses to the measures, the decision would be easy (high self-
efficacy condition) or difficult (low self-efficacy condition) for them to make. In 
reality, this feedback was unrelated to the background variables, and was simply 
designed to alter confidence levels, based on a similar manipulation of memory self-
efficacy developed by Gardiner and colleagues (1997). Participants in the control 
condition were given no such feedback. All participants then completed the first 
manipulation check (i.e., self-reported decision-specific DMSE), after which they 
were asked to select the number of photo printers they wished to choose from, ranging 
from 4 to 20 options in increments of 4 (i.e., 4, 8, 12, 16, or 20). Participants were then 
provided with instructions regarding the decision task, including details on how to 
navigate the information grid. Immediately prior to starting the decision task, 
participants in the experimental conditions were reminded of their alleged ability to 
make the decision (participants in the control condition received no such reminder), 
and all participants completed a second manipulation check. All participants, 
independent of their reported choice set size preferences, then completed the decision 
task using the 20-option information grid, and indicated their desired printer. We 
opted against adjusting the size of the information grid to participants’ choice set size 
preferences because this would have confounded measures of set size preferences and 
information search. After participants made their decisions, they were checked for 
suspicion and debriefed. 
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Participants completed all study components using a desktop computer running 
E-Prime 2.0 experimental software. The entire experimental session lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. After data collection was completed for Studies 2a-2c, one 
participant was randomly selected and received the printer of her choice. 
 
Results 
 In preliminary analyses, no gender effects were observed, thus gender will not 
be discussed further. To assess the influence of the self-efficacy manipulation on the 
dependent measures, I first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
with condition (low efficacy, high efficacy, control) as the independent variable and 
self-efficacy (manipulation checks 1 and 2), preferred choice set size, and total 
information viewed as the dependent variables. The overall effect of condition across 
the dependent measures was significant, F(8, 98) = 2.55, p < .05, η2p = .17. Results for 
each dependent measure are reported below (see also Table 3). 
 Manipulation Checks. Self-efficacy was measured at two separate times prior 
to the decision task to ensure that the manipulations were effective. As illustrated in 
Table 3, participants assigned to the low-efficacy condition reported significantly 
lower levels of efficacy than the high-efficacy or control condition participants at both 
time points. Participants in the high-efficacy and control conditions reported equally 
high efficacy levels at both time points. 
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Choice Set Size Preferences and Information Seeking. As predicted, 
participants in the low-efficacy condition preferred significantly fewer options than 
those in the control or high-efficacy conditions (see Table 3). The other two conditions 
preferred equivalent amounts of choice. Also consistent with my hypothesis, 
participants in the low-efficacy condition viewed significantly fewer pieces of 
information within the decision grid than participants in high efficacy condition, and 
marginally less information (p = .06) than participants in the control condition (see 
Table 3). 
 Covariate Analyses. To control for the effects of component-based DMSE, 
maximizing, motivational priorities, and personality factors on the dependent 
measures, I conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) using the 
background measures as covariates. Inclusion of these covariates did not significantly 
alter the MANOVA results reported in Table 3, and there were no significant effects 
of the covariates in the MANCOVA. 
Table 3. Dependent measures by condition in Study 2a. 
  Condition      
  
Low 
Efficacy   
High 
Efficacy   Control   ANOVA 
Variable M (SD)   M (SD)   M (SD)   F η2p 
Self-Efficacy 1 62.2
a 
(15.5)  
75.1b 
(14.4)  
78.0b 
(10.5)  6.86** .21 
Self-Efficacy 2 68.2
a 
(14.9)  
78.1b 
(12.1)  
79.5b 
(11.9)  4.00* .14 
Preferred Choice 
Set Size 
8.2a 
(3.8)  
13.8b 
(5.5)  
13.8b 
(6.3)  6.57** .21 
Information 
Viewed 
125.4a 
(77.6)  
195.3b 
(105.8)  
183.9ab 
(92.6)  2.95
t .10 
Note. Different superscript letters indicate significantly different (p < .05) means 
within rows. n = 18 for each condition. 
tp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .005.  
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Discussion 
  As predicted, participants whose self-efficacy levels were experimentally 
reduced desired fewer options and viewed less information relative to individuals 
whose efficacy levels were enhanced or unaltered. These results suggest that self-
efficacy influences people’s motivation to seek complex decision tasks as well as the 
thoroughness of their information search patterns.  
Contrary to my predictions, however, no significant differences were observed 
in any dependent measures between the high-efficacy and control conditions. This 
may reflect high default confidence levels among college students with respect to 
making decisions in the target domain (photo printers). Alternatively, it may be the 
case that the high efficacy induction was consistent with participants’ default 
expectations regarding the task difficulty, and thus had little effect on their choice set 
size preferences and decision process. Future studies incorporating more challenging 
decision domains and/or participants with lower baseline self-efficacy might avoid 
these limitations.  
Importantly, it should be noted that, due to random assignment, there is no 
reason to assume that participants in the experimental conditions differed in their 
actual decision-making abilities. This perspective is supported by the finding that 
including covariates in the analyses did not significantly alter the pattern of results. 
Thus, differences in decision-making across conditions appear to be the product of 
efficacy manipulations alone. 
 
Study 2b: Maximizing and choice set size preferences 
 Study 2b was conducted to examine the extent to which maximizing directly 
influences choice set size preferences. The results of Study 1 indicated that 
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maximizing is correlated with choice set size preferences at the inter-individual level, 
as previously demonstrated by Dar-Nimrod and colleagues (2009). However, no prior 
study has examined this relationship using experimental inductions of maximizing 
versus satisficing. In Study 2b, participants received instructional manipulations 
designed to induce either maximizing or satisficing. After this manipulation, 
participants completed the same decision among photo printers used in Study 2a. I 
predicted that participants who were induced to maximize would desire more choice 
and seek more information than participants who were induced to satisfice. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Fifty-one undergraduate students (58.8% female, aged 18-24, M = 20.0 years) 
were recruited to participate in this study in exchange for course credit. Seven 
participants from the experimental conditions were excluded from the data analyses 
because they failed to affirm the instructional manipulations (final N = 44). 
 
Measures and Procedure 
 Participants in Study 2b completed the exact same background measures and 
experimental protocol used in Study 2a with the following exceptions: Instead of 
receiving false feedback regarding their ability to complete the decision task, 
participants in the experimental conditions were asked to affirm a set of instructions 
designed to induce either maximizing or satisficing.12 Also, the manipulation checks 
                                                
12 The affirmation-based induction was used because a previous attempt to induce maximizing versus 
satisficing was unsuccessful in a pilot sample (N = 52). In the pilot study, participants in the 
maximizing condition were told that there was a high degree of variability between the options, and that 
they should consequently attempt to select the best possible printer. By contrast, participants in the 
satisficing condition were told that the options were relatively equivalent, and that they should 
consequently try to choose one that was simply “good enough.” This pilot study found no differences 
between the experimental conditions for any of the dependent measures. 
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for the self-efficacy manipulation were replaced with manipulation checks for 
maximizing. 
 After completing the set of background questionnaires (see Study 2a for details), 
participants assigned to the maximizing condition were instructed to try to choose the 
“best possible” printer, while participants assigned to the satisficing condition were 
instructed to choose a printer that was simply “good enough” for them. Immediately 
after receiving the instructional manipulation, participants in the maximizing and 
satisficing conditions were then asked to affirm their intentions to maximize or 
satisfice, respectively, on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 - Strongly Disagree to 7 - 
Strongly Agree). Participants whose responses on the scale were 4 or below 
(indicating a lack of agreement) were excluded from data analyses (see below). 
 Participants then completed the same decision task used in Study 2a (excluding 
self-efficacy ratings). After completing the decision task, participants reported the 
extent to which they maximized versus satisficed using a 7-point Likert-type scale 
(from 1 - I tried to select an option that was simply ‘good enough’ to 7 - I tried to 
select the best possible option). After completing this manipulation check, participants 
were debriefed and thanked for participating. 
 
Results 
To investigate the effect of the maximizing manipulation on the dependent 
measures, I first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
condition (maximizing, satisficing, control) as the independent variable and self-
reported maximizing, preferred choice set, and total information viewed as the 
dependent variables. The overall effect of condition across the dependent measures 
was not significant, F(6, 80) = .273, n.s. 
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Table 4. Dependent measures by condition in Study 2b. 
 Condition   
 Satisficing (n = 12)  
Maximizing 
 (n = 15)  
Control  
(n = 17)  ANOVA 
Variable M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  F η2p 
Preferred Choice Set 
Size 
10.3 
(3.6)  
11.2 
(5.9)  
11.8 
(5.9)  .25 .01 
Information Viewed 192.5 (189.2)  
119.9 
(77.5)  
169.8 
(91.5)  1.29 .06 
Reported 
Maximizing 
4.9a 
(1.8)  
5.9b 
(1.0)  
5.9b 
(1.0)  2.97
t .13 
Note. Within rows, different superscript letters indicate significantly different 
means (p < .05). Participants reported maximizing following completion of the 
decision task. 
tp < .1, *p < .05, **p < .005. 
 
As depicted in Table 4, participants in the satisficing condition reported 
marginally less maximizing (i.e., greater satisficing) relative to participants in the 
maximizing and control conditions. Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no 
significant differences in choice set size preferences or information seeking among 
experimental conditions. Including the covariate measures in a MANCOVA did not 
significantly alter the pattern of results reported in Table 4 below, and there were no 
significant effects of the covariates on choice set size preferences or information 
seeking. 
 
 
Discussion 
 Results of Study 2b did not support my hypothesis that experimentally induced 
maximizing would increase preferences for choice and information seeking relative to 
inductions of satisficing. There were no significant differences among conditions for 
either choice set size preferences or information seeking. If anything, participants who 
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were instructed to satisfice actually viewed more information (though not significantly 
so) than those who were told to maximize. Furthermore, covariate analyses indicated 
that self-reported habitual maximizing, assessed prior to the decision task, was not 
significantly associated with either behavioral measure of decision making (i.e., choice 
set size preferences or information seeking). 
 These null results are surprising in light of evidence from Study 1 and earlier 
research by Dar-Nimrod and colleagues (2009) that maximizing is correlated with 
preferences for larger choice sets. However, those studies examined maximizing from 
an individual differences perspective and did not attempt to manipulate the construct. 
Given that maximizing is typically conceptualized as a relatively stable habitual 
tendency, as opposed to a situation-dependent factor (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009), it may 
be resistant to experimental manipulations. Results of Study 2b, combined with results 
from a previous pilot study (see Footnote 12), support this interpretation. On the other 
hand, covariate analyses in Study 2b did not find evidence linking inter-individual 
differences in maximizing to choice set size preferences, contrary to the findings of 
Study 1. These inconsistent results raise the possibility that the relationship between 
maximizing and choice set size preferences may depend on the specific decision 
context. 
Although the results of Study 2b are equivocal with respect to the relationship 
between maximizing and choice set size preferences, they are relatively clear with 
respect to the overarching research question: Maximizing is not a promising candidate 
mechanism for experimentally altering age differences in choice set size preferences 
or information seeking. 
 
Study 2c: Motivational priorities and choice set size preferences  
 Study 2c was conducted to test the causal link between motivational priorities 
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(i.e., regulating emotion versus seeking information) and choice set size preferences. 
Participants completed the exact same decision as in Studies 2a and 2b; however, in 
Study 2c they received instructional manipulations designed to induce the pursuit of 
either information-seeking or emotion-regulation goals. It was hypothesized that 
participants who were induced to pursue information-seeking goals would desire more 
choice and seek more information than individuals who were imbued with emotion-
regulation goals. 
 
Participants 
 Twenty undergraduate students (50% female, aged 19-24, M = 20.2 years) 
were recruited to participate in this study in exchange for course credit. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
 Study 2c was identical to Studies 2a and 2b except for the following 
differences: After completing the background (covariate) measures and being 
informed that they would be making a decision among photo printers, participants 
received instructions designed to alter their motivational priorities during the decision 
task. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to receive instructions 
designed to elicit either emotion-regulation goals (i.e., emotion-focus condition) or 
information-seeking goals (i.e., information-focus condition) Adapting instructions 
developed by Löckenhoff and Carstensen (2007), participants in the emotion-focus 
condition were instructed to focus on their feelings throughout the task, while 
participants in the information-focus condition were instructed to focus on the specific 
facts and details. Participants in the control condition received no such instructions. 
All participants then completed the same decision task as in Study 2b. For participants 
in the experimental conditions, the instructional manipulations were repeated after 10 
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pieces of information were viewed in the decision grid. Finally, as a manipulation 
check, participants were asked to report how much they focused on their “feelings 
about the options” (emotion focus) and the “details of the options” (information focus) 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 - not at all to 7 - very much). 
Results 
Contrary to my hypothesis, participants who were induced to focus on their 
emotions desired more choice relative to those who were instructed to focus on the 
available information, t(18) = 2.36, p < .05 (see Table 5 below). No significant 
differences emerged between the two experimental conditions on any other dependent 
measures, including the information-focus versus emotion-focus manipulation checks. 
Including the covariates in the analyses did not alter the pattern of results depicted in 
Table 5 with the following exception: Post-hoc tests indicated that participants in the 
emotion-focus condition reported marginally greater emotion focus (M = 5.3, SE = 
.63) than those in the information-focus condition (M = 3.3, SE = .63), p < .10. None 
of the covariates significantly predicted choice set size preferences or information 
seeking in the MANCOVA. 
 
Table 5. Dependent measures by condition in Study 2c. 
 Condition    
 Emotion Focus (n = 10)  
Information Focus  
(n = 10)    
Variable M (SD)  M (SD)  t d 
Preferred Choice Set 
Size 14.0 (6.6)  8.0 (4.6)  -2.36* 1.05 
Information Viewed 103.6 (36.7)  106.7 (72.5)  .12 .05 
Feeling Focus 4.4 (2.3)  4.2 (1.8)  -.22 .10 
Detail Focus 5.6 (1.4)  5.3 (1.3)  -.50 .22 
Note. Effect size shown is Cohen's d. 
*p < .05.             
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Discussion 
Contrary to my hypothesis, participants who were instructed to focus on their 
emotions desired significantly more choice than those who were instructed to focus on 
the available information. However, the two groups did not differ on any other 
dependent measures. These counter-intuitive results may reflect different patterns of 
participant reasoning than originally anticipated. For instance, participants in the 
emotion-focus condition may have held optimistic views of large choice sets and 
envisioned more positive emotional outcomes for the corresponding decisions. By 
contrast, participants in the information-focus condition may have focused on the 
possibility of information overload when considering the larger choice sets and 
consequently avoided them. 
Alternatively, these findings may result from a manipulation that did not work 
as intended, as indicated by the self-report manipulation check data. Even after 
controlling for the covariates, the emotion-focus manipulation check was only 
marginally different between the two experimental conditions, and the information-
focus manipulation check did not differ at all across conditions. Thus, it remains 
unclear whether the manipulation used in this study altered participants’ goals, 
construal of the decision task, or something else entirely. Because the manipulation 
check did not differ between conditions, we cannot draw conclusions regarding the 
mechanisms behind the observed differences in choice set size preferences across 
conditions.  
Another important limitation of the present study is the small sample size (N = 
20). Because of the small number of participants per condition, it is possible that the 
present results are due to unbalanced assignment to condition, i.e., participants who 
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habitually desire more choice may have been disproportionately assigned to the 
emotion-focus condition. 
Irrespective of the mechanism behind these puzzling results, it should be 
acknowledged that they contradict predictions based on socioemotional selectivity 
theory. That is, the finding that prioritizing emotional goals leads to an increased 
desire for choice is difficult to reconcile with mounting evidence of age-related shifts 
toward prioritizing emotional over informational goals in decision-making (Mather, 
2006) and preferring smaller versus larger choice sets (Reed et al., 2008). 
Consequently, in light of the present results, it appears unlikely that manipulating 
motivational priorities in the present manner across age groups would alter age 
differences in choice set size preferences or information seeking in the hypothesized 
manner. 
 
General Discussion for Studies 2a-2c  
 Results from Studies 2a-2c provide only limited support for the hypothesized 
influences on choice set size preferences in younger adults. As predicted, 
manipulations of decision-making self-efficacy in Study 2a significantly affected how 
much choice participants desired and how much information they viewed while 
making the subsequent decision. In contrast, experimental inductions of maximizing 
(versus satisficing) in Study 2b did not influence choice set size preferences or 
information search. Manipulating motivational priorities in Study 2c resulted in 
differential preferences for choice set sizes, but equivalent information seeking. 
However, the effects of the experimental manipulation in Study 2c directly 
contradicted my hypothesis that participants in the emotion-focus condition would 
desire more choice than those in the information-focus condition. Not only did most of 
the experimental manipulations not work as expected, but covariate analyses indicated 
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that inter-individual differences in self-efficacy, maximizing, and motivational 
priorities were not significantly associated with choice set size preferences in Studies 
2a-2c. 
 In support of the notion that choice set size preferences and information 
seeking tendencies have common underlying mechanisms, significant correlations 
were observed between choice set size preferences and information viewed 
(Spearman’s ρ = .24, p < .001) when collapsing across Studies 2a-2c. However, given 
evidence from Studies 2b and 2c that manipulations can differentially affect choice set 
size preferences versus information search, it is likely that any potential linkages 
between the two aspects of decision-making are only modest in size. 
 Studies 2a-2c possess a number of shared methodological limitations that 
should be acknowledged. First, the samples in all three studies consisted entirely of 
undergraduate students, and results may not generalize to other populations, such as 
older age groups or individuals with more diverse educational backgrounds. 
Replicating these findings across demographically varied and nationally representative 
samples is recommended for future research. Second, the studies only examined 
choice set size preferences for a single consumer decision (i.e., photo printers). This 
domain was specifically chosen because pilot testing indicated that participants had 
minimal experience in that choice domain. Thus, it is unclear whether the same pattern 
of results would extend to other choice domains, including more consequential and/or 
familiar decisions. Replicating the studies across multiple choice domains is crucial 
before drawing firm conclusions with respect to the influence of maximizing, 
motivational priorities, and decision-making self-efficacy on choice set size 
preferences. In addition, all three studies used a computerized decision grid that 
artificially constrained access to information one piece at a time. This approach has 
been widely used in previous research (for a review, see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
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1993), including multiple studies with age comparisons (for a review, see Mata & 
Nunes, 2010). Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether results of Studies 2a-2c would 
generalize to alternative decision paradigms (e.g., in which multiple pieces of 
information were viewable at one time). 
 In sum, the only construct that influenced choice set size preferences in the 
expected direction was decision-making self-efficacy. Consequently, of the three 
factors explored in Studies 2a-2c—DMSE, maximizing, and motivational priorities—
DMSE is the most plausible candidate for experimentally altering choice set size 
preferences across age groups. In the following chapter I report a study that examined 
the influence of experimental manipulations of DMSE on age differences in choice set 
size preferences.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECTS OF DECISION-MAKING SELF-EFFICACY ON 
CHOICE SET SIZE PREFERENCES ACROSS THE ADULT LIFE SPAN 
 As the ‘capstone’ study of this line of research, Study 3 was designed to 
synthesize the developmental perspective of Study 1 with the experimental approach 
of Studies 2a-2c. The goal of Study 3 was to investigate how older and young adults’ 
choice set size preferences shift when their DMSE is manipulated. As previously 
stated, results of Studies 2a-2c suggested DMSE as the most promising candidate for 
manipulating age differences in choice set size preferences. Thus, Study 3 
incorporated the same experimental manipulation as Study 2a, but extended it to a 
different choice domain. 
 As in Study 2a, participants completed a computerized consumer decision task 
after receiving instructions designed to increase or decrease their levels of DMSE. 
However, instead of making realistic decisions among photo printers, participants in 
Study 3 made hypothetical choices among cars, a domain which has been successfully 
used in previous studies examining age differences in decision-making (Johnson, 
1990; Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005). 
 I hypothesized that (1) older adults would prefer fewer options and seek less 
information than younger adults and (2) age differences in choice set size preferences 
and information seeking would be mitigated by increasing older adults’ DMSE or 
decreasing younger adults’ DMSE. 
 
Participants 
 One hundred and twenty adults aged 18-90 (M = 46.2 years, SD = 26.0 years; 
70% female) participated in Study 3. As depicted in Table 3 below, the sample 
consisted of sixty-five younger adults (aged 18-37) and fifty-five older adults (aged 
60-89). Eighty-five participants were recruited from the Ithaca, N.Y. community to 
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participate in exchange for monetary compensation. Thirty-five younger participants 
were recruited from the undergraduate student population of Cornell University to 
participate in exchange for course credit. All participants in Study 3 also completed 
Study 1 in a combined testing session. Eight participants were excluded from data 
analyses because of computer malfunctions and one was excluded because of 
suspicion over the false feedback manipulation (final N = 111). 
 
Table 6. Participant characteristics in Study 3. 	  	  
Measure Younger Adults Older Adults  	  
(n = 65) (n = 55) t X2 
Age (years), M (SD) 23.7 (6.5) 73.5 (8.8) -35.26**   
Age range (years) 18-37 60-90   
Socioeconomic Status 3.1 2.92 .67  
Education (Years) 14.6 16.2 -3.17**  
Sex (% female) 67.7% 72.7%  1.18 
Hispanic (%) 7.7% 1.8%  2.63 
Race (%)    9.94 
Caucasian 81.5% 90.9%   
Asian or Pacific Islander 7.7% 1.8%   
African American 6.2% 1.8%   
Other 4.6% 3.6%     
Note. Socioeconomic status measured via self-reports on 5-point Likert-type 
scale (from 1 - Lower Income to 5 - Upper Income). 
**p < .005, *p < .05.    	  
 
Measures and Procedure 
 Study 3 was identical to Studies 2a-2c except for the following differences: 
Prior to the decision task portion of the study, all participants completed the 
computerized questionnaire from Study 1, in place of the background questionnaire 
administered at the start of Studies 2a-2c. This served to enhance the plausibility of the 
false feedback manipulation. Next, participants were informed that they would be 
making a hypothetical decision among cars. Participants in the experimental 
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conditions (high- and low-efficacy) then viewed a computerized message that 
informed them that the computer was analyzing their responses to the previous 
questionnaires to determine how easy or difficult the ensuing decision would be. 
These participants then received the same false feedback manipulations of self-
efficacy as in Study 2a, while participants in the control condition received no such 
feedback. As in Study 2a, participants then rated their DMSE and indicated their 
preferred choice set size. 
 Next, participants completed a computerized decision task modeled after the 
decision task used in Studies 2a-2c, with the following exceptions: Instead of choosing 
among photo printers, participants selected among “hypothetical” cars labeled with 
names of rare birds (e.g., “Pipit,” “Turaco,” and “Xenops”). In reality these cars 
represented the 20 most common mid-sized sedans sold in the U.S. The cars were 
defined by the following six attributes: gas mileage, horsepower, turning radius, safety 
rating, comfort, and dependability. Attribute information was gathered from the car 
comparison website Edmunds.com, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration website, and the JD Power and Associates website. The information 
sheet provided to participants was modeled after the one used in Studies 2a-2c. For 
instance, safety rating was defined as follows: 
 
“The safety rating refers to the amount of protection provided by the 
car to its passengers during a crash. These ratings are provided by the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which tests all 
vehicles in terms of their crash safety and rates them from 1 (Worst) to 
5 (Best).” 
 
Other than the choice domain and attributes, the decision task in Study 3 was identical 
to that used in Study 2a. After participants completed the decision task, they were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
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Results 
 Hypotheses were tested using a two-way multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), with age group (younger vs. older) and condition (high efficacy vs. low 
efficacy vs. control) as independent variables and reported self-efficacy, choice set 
size preferences, and information viewed as the dependent variables. Results are 
depicted in Table 7 below. 
The main effect of age in the MANOVA was significant, F(4, 100) = 6.94, p < 
.001, η2p = .22. Subsequent univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) indicated that 
the main effect of age was significant for choice set size preferences, F(1, 103) = 
10.51, p < .005, η2p = .09, and for information seeking F(1, 103) = 9.53, p < .005, η2p = 
.09. Consistent with my hypotheses, older adults desired fewer choices (M = 6.9, SD = 
4.3) than younger adults (M = 10.0, SD = 5.5), and also viewed less information (M = 
97.0, SD = 75.9) than younger adults (M = 160.4, SD = 126.3). 
The main effect of condition in the MANOVA was significant, F(8, 202) = 
2.27, p < .05, η2p = .08, however, the age by condition interaction was not significant, 
F(8, 202) = .85, n.s., η2p = .04. As depicted in Table 7, the main effect of condition was 
significant for information search, such that participants in the control condition 
sought significantly more information than those in the experimental conditions. Also, 
there was a marginally significant condition effect for reported self-efficacy at Time 2. 
While younger adults’ self-efficacy did not differ across conditions, older adults’ self-
efficacy at Time 2 was significantly lower in the low-efficacy versus high-efficacy 
condition (p < .05) and marginally lower in the low-efficacy versus control condition 
(p < .06). 
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Table 7. Dependent measures by age group and condition for Study 3.  
Pref. Choice = Preferred choice set size; Info. Viewed = Information viewed. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Within conditions and rows, different letters 
indicate significantly different means. **p < .005, *p < .05. 
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 Because the efficacy manipulation was only successful for the older but not for 
the younger group, I conducted post-hoc analyses that selectively examined condition 
effects among older adults. Results indicated that older adults in the low-efficacy 
condition preferred marginally fewer options than those in the high-efficacy condition 
(p < .10), and viewed significantly less information than those in the control condition 
(p < .05). No other comparisons reached significance. 
 Consistent with the results of Studies 2a-2c, choice set size preferences and 
information search were significantly correlated across participants (Spearman’s ρ = 
.28, p < .005). 
Inclusion of covariates (component-based DMSE, maximizing, emotion-
regulation and information-seeking goals, digit-span, vocabulary, and numeracy) did 
not significantly alter the MANOVA results, and none of the covariates was 
significantly associated with choice set size preferences or information-seeking. 
 
Discussion 
 Consistent with my first hypothesis, older adults desired fewer options and 
viewed less information than younger adults. However, my hypothesis that 
experimentally manipulating decision-making self-efficacy would alter age differences 
in choice set size preferences was not supported: There was no significant age by 
condition interaction for choice set size preferences or information seeking. 
 Moreover, the self-efficacy manipulation was largely ineffective, as evidenced 
by the manipulation check data. Younger adults’ reported efficacy and decision 
making did not vary across conditions, and among older adults only the low-efficacy 
manipulation altered their DMSE and only for one of the two manipulation checks. 
The lack of an effective DMSE manipulation is important to note because it represents 
the most plausible and parsimonious explanation for the failure to support my 
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hypotheses with respect to choice set size preferences and information seeking. 
 The relative lack of effects of the DMSE manipulation is especially surprising 
given the results of Study 2a, in which choice set size preferences and information 
search were significantly altered in younger adults using virtually the same 
manipulation as the present study. On one hand, the relative lack of effects in the 
present study may reflect subtle differences in experimental designs between Studies 
2a and 3. For instance, participants in Study 2a were told prior to completing 
background measures that they would help determine the task difficulty. By contrast, 
participants in Study 3 were only informed of the diagnostic value of the background 
measures after completing them. Consequently, the efficacy induction in Study 3 may 
not have been as believable as that in Study 2a. On the other hand, it may be the case 
that the younger adults were more skeptical of the false feedback than the older adults. 
In addition, Study 2a used a realistic decision whereas the decision in Study 3 was 
hypothetical, and the domains differed between the two studies as well (i.e., photo 
printers in Study 2a versus cars in Study 3). Thus, there are many potential 
explanations for the discrepant findings between Study 2a and Study 3. 
Either way, these findings highlight the importance of developing robust 
manipulations of DMSE in future research. 
 It should also be acknowledged that the decision task used in Study 3 placed 
considerable demands on working memory that may have influenced information-
seeking behavior. Because participants were only allowed to view one piece of 
information at a time, the extent to which they sought information was likely 
constrained by their ability and/or motivation to process and evaluate multiple 
attributes at once. It remains unclear, therefore, whether the observed age differences 
would extend to decisions that do not place demands on working memory capacity 
(e.g., in which all information is visible at once). 
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 One unexpected finding deserves additional discussion: Participants in the 
control conditions viewed significantly more information than those in the 
experimental conditions. This may reflect a byproduct of participant skepticism over 
the false feedback in the experimental conditions—that is, participants in the high- and 
low-efficacy conditions may have invested less effort in making their decisions (i.e., 
sought less information) as a reaction to suspicions about the validity of the feedback. 
This finding, in addition to the results discussed above, reinforces the need for a more 
effective manipulation of DMSE. 
 In sum, results of the present study suggest that the effects of DMSE on choice 
set size preferences are limited to low-efficacy inductions, disproportionately 
influence older versus younger adults, and are inconsistent with correlational evidence 
from Study 1. Although the results of Study 3 did not support my hypotheses, they 
nonetheless hint at the possibility that age differences in preferences for choice and 
information seeking might be altered by using improved DMSE inductions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The overarching goal of the present studies was to investigate the driving factors 
behind age differences in choice set size preferences. On the one hand, the studies 
were successful in replicating previously observed age differences across domains and 
measures: Older adults preferred fewer options than younger adults, whether choice 
set size preferences were assessed via self-report measures across multiple decision 
domains (Study 1) or via behavioral measures for a single decision domain (Study 3). 
In addition, results of Study 1 demonstrate a linear relationship between age and 
choice set size preferences, as previously reported by Rozin and colleagues (2006). 
Thus, the present research provides valuable replication and extension of previous 
research findings on age differences in choice set size preferences. 
 In contrast to the clear evidence of age differences in choice set size preferences, 
the underlying mechanisms remain opaque. The three studies provide only mixed—if 
not contradictory—evidence for the hypothesized roles of decision-making self-
efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities in choice set size preferences. Study 
1, which incorporated a survey format, suggested that, of the three potential mediators, 
only maximizing was related to choice set size preferences—and only weakly so. In 
turn, results of Study 2a suggest that younger adults prefer more choice when they are 
induced to feel higher DMSE (consistent with my hypothesis) or pursue emotion-
regulatory goals (counter to my hypothesis), respectively. By contrast, experimental 
manipulations of maximizing versus satisficing had no effect on choice set size 
preferences in Study 2b. Finally, Study 3 failed to provide clear evidence that age 
differences in choice set size preferences can be altered via manipulations of DMSE. I 
will now discuss the specific implications of these results and future research 
directions in more detail. 
 Self-efficacy and Choice Set Size Preferences. Results of Studies 1, 2a, and 3 add 
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to the limited research on the role of self-efficacy in decision making. Whereas prior 
research found that high DMSE was associated with a preference for more complex 
decisions (Tabernero & Wood, 2009), Study 2a extended these findings to preferences 
for increased choice. In addition, prior studies demonstrated associations between 
higher DMSE and preferences for complex versus simple decisions (Tabernero & 
Wood, 2009) and increased information seeking (Seijts et al., 2004). Study 2a 
replicates these effects in the context of a single study using an experimental design 
and an incentive-compatible choice task, and suggests that the effects of DMSE may 
extend to decisions with real consequences as opposed to purely hypothetical 
laboratory tasks. Study 3 is also the first known study to implement an experimental 
approach to investigating the role of DMSE in decision-making across age groups. 
Experimental designs are crucial to addressing the potential influence of age-related 
confounds. 
 Results from Study 2a (and to a lesser extent Study 3) are all the more surprising 
in that the correlational data collected in Study 1 suggest that DMSE is not 
significantly associated with choice set size preferences. These discrepant results may 
stem from any number of significant methodological differences between the studies. 
For example, reliance on self-report versus behavioral measures of choice set size 
preferences (Study 1 vs. Studies 2a & 3), hypothetical versus incentive-compatible 
choices (Studies 1 & 3 vs. Study 2a), and natural variations in DMSE versus 
experimental manipulations (Study 1 vs. Studies 2a & 3) may all have contributed to 
the inconsistent pattern of results. These findings reinforce the importance of using 
converging methodological approaches in future research in this area. 
 As previously discussed, the one-sided effects of DMSE manipulations observed 
in the present studies (i.e., lowering DMSE but not increasing it) highlight the need for 
robust manipulations to study this construct in relation to decision-making tendencies. 
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Crucially, because decision-making self-efficacy, like other self-efficacy judgments, 
represents a characteristic of the person instead of the task per se (Bandura, 1997), the 
limitations of the present manipulations may stem from their emphasis on task 
characteristics (i.e., manipulating perceived abilities to perform a specific task) and 
their use of false feedback. Alternative, person-based approaches which alter peoples’ 
confidence in their abilities in a manner that is more independent of the target decision 
task—for instance via training across a variety of decision tasks—may prove more 
effective. 
 Maximizing and choice set size preferences. Consistent with my hypothesis, 
maximizing was correlated with choice set size preferences in Study 1. However, 
experimental manipulations of maximizing versus satisficing had no significant effects 
on choice set size preferences or information-seeking in Study 2b. At first glance, the 
lack of experimental effects of maximizing on choice set size preferences observed in 
Study 2b appears to contradict the findings of Study 1 and earlier research by Dar-
Nimrod and colleagues (2009). However, this discrepancy can be explained in several 
ways. First, as illustrated by the results of Study 2b (and the accompanying pilot 
study), maximizing may be a relatively stable trait that is resistant to manipulation. 
Quasi-experimental designs, as used by Dar-Nimrod and colleagues (2009) may 
therefore be superior to experimental manipulations when examining the role of 
maximizing in decision making. Alternatively, it may be the case that the effects of 
maximizing on choice set size preferences are best captured in real-world contexts 
(e.g., Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009). Thus, the hypothetical context (Study 1) and incentive-
compatible but laboratory-based context (Study 1b) in which choice set size 
preferences were measured, may not be ideal for assessing the role of maximizing. 
 Motivational priorities and choice set size preferences. Neither Study 1 nor 
Study 2c supported the hypothesized role of motivational priorities in choice set size 
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preferences. Study 1 found no correlation between self-report measures of choice set 
size preferences and emotion-regulation versus information-seeking goals. In part, this 
may be due to limitations in the novel and unvalidated measure of goal priorities 
employed in this study. Study 2c suggested counterintuitive effects of motivational 
manipulations: Participants who were encouraged to pursue emotion-regulatory goals 
desired more choice than those who were instructed to pursue information-seeking 
goals. On one hand, these results may be the product of a relatively small sample size 
(n = 10 per condition), which renders any conclusions drawn from the data tentative at 
best. 
On the other hand, if we assume that the findings represent actual effects (and 
not random noise), several substantive explanations can be offered. As previously 
discussed, there are multiple pathways by which emotion influences decision making 
and, depending on which aspect of emotion participants were focused on, the 
manipulations of motivational priorities may have had different effects on decision 
behavior. On the one hand, participants may have focused on their emotional states 
during the experiment. If they were in relatively positive moods, these participants 
would have desired larger choice sets because positive affect increases variety-seeking 
(e.g., Kahn & Isen, 1993). On the other hand, participants may have focused on 
affective appraisals of the choice sets. For instance, if participants in this study 
(undergraduate students) held relatively positive views of the consequences of choice, 
and they may have selectively focused on the expected benefits (e.g., with respect to 
satisfaction) of larger choice sets when they were instructed to focus on their feelings. 
Future research might benefit from systematically varying which aspect of emotion 
individuals focus on (e.g., emotional states versus appraisals) and assessing the impact 
on choice set size preferences and decision making. 
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Mental representations of choice sets 
 Another important issue for future research concerns the mental representations 
of choice sets and decisions. That is, how were people conceptualizing the 
consequences of differently sized choice sets? As implied by the conceptual 
framework of the present research, there are several possibilities: First, participants 
may have been assessing the extent to which different choice sets would tax their 
ability to make effective decisions, consistent with a self-efficacy perspective. 
Alternatively, they may have pondered which choice set would best enable them to 
achieve their goals, whether those involved selecting the best possible alternative (i.e., 
maximizing) versus one that was simply good enough (i.e., satisficing), or seeking 
information versus regulating their emotions. 
 It is difficult to directly address the question of mental representations about 
choice sets because of the quasi-inferential approach used in the present studies. For 
instance, in the laboratory-based studies (2a-3) I manipulated participants’ efficacy 
(Studies 2a & 3), decision strategies (Study 2b), or goals (Study 2c) and assumed that 
any ensuing differences in decision behavior across experimental conditions reflected 
conscious, deliberate responses to these manipulations. However, participants’ thought 
processes at the time of selecting a choice set were not directly or explicitly assessed. 
Because representations of choice sets and the decision task may vary depending on 
age and other individual difference characteristics, it may be valuable to directly 
measure these representations. Future studies incorporating a real-time thought-listing 
component might shed more light on what is actually going through older versus 
younger adults’ minds when they select among choice sets of varying size. 
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Covariates of Choice Set Size Preferences 
 Across all of the laboratory studies, individual difference measures of self-
efficacy, maximizing, and motivational priorities had no effects on choice set size 
preferences or information seeking. That background DMSE did not affect either 
aspect of decision-making may have been due to a lack of specificity. Theoretically 
self-efficacy is thought to vary across situations even within a given domain of 
functioning (Bandura, 1997). Thus, participants’ generalized confidence in their 
decision-making abilities may not have affected the specific requirements of the 
computerized decision task used in Studies 2a-3. 
The non-significant effect of background maximizing and motivational 
priorities may reflect the fact that the computerized decision tasks used in Studies 2a-
2c and 3 were not affectively salient. Implementing a more vivid decision task, such as 
by conducting this research in a real-world setting, would address these limitations. 
Alternatively, the role of motivational priorities may have been obscured by the fact 
that the novel measure of information-seeking versus emotion-regulation goals was 
not psychometrically sound. The lack of divergent validity between the two subscales 
is particularly problematic, given that socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 
2006) posits an orthogonal (and often oppositional) relationship between the two goal 
categories. Revising this measure to gauge prioritizing one goal instead of the other, 
such as by placing each goal type at opposite ends of a scale, should yield more 
psychometrically sound data. 
 Finally, it should be noted that neither short-term memory nor numeracy 
influenced choice set size preferences in Studies 1 or 3, which argues against 
interpreting age differences in choice set size preferences as a product of cognitive 
decline. That is, it appears that older adults do not simply prefer fewer options because 
of deficits in cognitive abilities. However, future studies might test the role of 
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cognition more thoroughly by including a wider variety of cognitive measures, 
including tests of working memory capacity or information processing speed, that 
have been related to age differences in decision-making (e.g., Finucane & Gullion, 
2010). 
 
Implications for future research 
 Results from the present studies have direct implications for theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the study of choice set size preferences. First, the combined 
results suggest that choice set size preferences have multiple, if weak, underlying 
influences. Some of these factors, such as maximizing, expansive future time 
perspectives, and positive beliefs about choice, may promote desires for increased 
choice. For instance, people who held more positive beliefs about the consequences of 
increased choice also preferred more options compared to people whose views of 
choice were relatively more negative. On the other hand, factors such as crystallized 
intelligence (i.e., vocabulary) may act to inhibit preferences for greater choice. 
However, many factors, such as motivational priorities and short-term memory, were 
unrelated or inconsistently related to choice set size preferences, despite prior 
theoretical or empirical support for their role. 
 Given how few variables were significantly correlated with choice set size 
preferences in Study 1, it is likely that the latter construct is influenced by factors 
which were not considered in this research. Future research might benefit from using 
an even broader approach than that of Study 1 to examine a variety of influences on 
choice set size preferences across age groups. These factors might include decision-
related counterfactual thinking and regret, which appear to decline with age (e.g., 
Tanius et al., 2009) and are associated with maximizing tendencies across age groups 
(e.g., Schwartz et al., 2002). Alternatively, it may be useful to consider decision-
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related factors that are not necessarily salient to conscious thought. For instance, 
incidental mood may contribute to age differences in choice set size preferences given 
evidence that emotional states influence the process and outcome of decision making 
(for a discussion, see Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007) and that older adults 
experience a greater ratio of positive versus negative emotions in daily life (e.g., 
Carstensen et al., 2010). Further, the relative lack of consistency between self-report 
versus behavioral measures and correlational versus experimental findings highlight 
the importance of converging methodological approaches to studying choice set size 
preferences, and decision making in general. 
 One plausible interpretation of the present results is that age differences in 
choice set size preferences are the product of cohort effects. As previously discussed 
in Chapter Two, older adults’ formative years are likely to have occurred before the 
proliferation of choice, whereas today’s younger adults live in an era of unprecedented 
choice in almost every domain imaginable (Iyengar, 2010; Schwartz, 2004). Thus, 
older adults may desire fewer options than younger adults because they are relatively 
more accustomed to limited choice in decision environments. Future research could 
rule out this interpretation by adopting longitudinal, as opposed to cross-sectional, 
designs. Although this may seem, at first glance, a defeatist acknowledgment that 
research on the developmental mechanisms underlying age differences in choice set 
size preferences is futile, this is by no means the case. In fact, regardless of whether 
older adults prefer fewer options than younger adults for developmental versus 
historical reasons, developing means of altering choice set size preferences among 
older adults remains a worthy goal because of the potential to optimize decision 
outcomes, as discussed below. 
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Implications for real-life outcomes 
 Results of the present study have implications for public policy involving age 
differences in decision making. Research evidence suggests that people may avoid 
consequential decisions such as choosing 401k investments or Medicare Part D 
prescription drug plans because there are too many options (Boatwright & Nunes, 
2001; Reed et al., 2008; Tanius et al., 2009). Although effects of DMSE manipulations 
among older adults in Study 3 were largely non-significant, the pattern of observed 
means suggests that it may be possible for robust DMSE manipulations to alter age 
differences in choice set size preferences in a laboratory setting. Perhaps, then, real-
world interventions based on DMSE can be developed to encourage older adults to 
embrace larger choice sets and remain active and involved in decision making. For 
instance, assuring older adults that they can successfully manage the daunting task of 
choosing a prescription drug insurance plan among the dozens of options in Medicare 
Part D may reduce the number of seniors who fail to enroll in any plan (Reed et al., 
2008). Future investigations of the link between self-efficacy and decision-making in 
real-life decision contexts such as health insurance and retirement plans could help to 
develop means of identifying and assisting individuals who suffer financial 
consequences from avoiding such decisions. 
  
Conclusion 
 Combined results of the three studies presented here present an empirical puzzle: 
Age differences and intra-individual variability in choice set size preferences are easy 
to identify, yet difficult to explain. What few factors that appear to influence choice 
set size preferences are neither robust nor consistent, and effects observed using one 
methodological approach may not replicate in another. Moreover, the lack of observed 
mediation effects underscores the possibility that age differences in choice set size 
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preferences are merely the result of cohort effects. In spite of these ambiguous results, 
however, one thing is clear: Though age differences in choice set size preferences 
cannot be explained by any of the hypothesized factors, the present results do not rule 
out the possibility that age differences may be amenable to alteration via decision-
making self-efficacy manipulations. Thus, in attempting to answer the question of why 
older adults want less choice than younger adults, the present research provides 
tentative answers to the corollary question of how to modify the age gap in choice set 
size preferences. The answer to the original question, however, remains elusive.
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Component Decision-Making Self-Efficacy Measure 
 
Instructions: For this questionnaire we are interested in how you feel about your 
ability to successfully complete different aspects of everyday decision-making. For 
each aspect of everyday decision-making listed below, please indicate how confident 
you are using the scale provided. 
 
When you are making decisions among different 
options, how confident are you that you can… 
Rating 
not at all 
confident 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
very 
confident 
...fully understand information about different 
options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...prevent yourself from making impulsive 
decisions. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...accurately judge your decision-making abilities. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...choose an option that makes you satisfied. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...make choices that reflect your beliefs and values. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...compare and contrast the information about 
various options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...choose the most effective decision strategy. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...choose the best possible option. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...accurately remember information about different 
options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...think rationally about the different options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...effectively use different decision strategies. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
...be consistent in your preferences. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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Appendix B. Motivational Priorities in Decision-Making (MP-DM) Measure 
 
Instructions: For this questionnaire we are interested in what motivates you when you 
are making everyday decisions. Please think about the decisions you make in your 
everyday life. While keeping these decisions in mind, please indicate how important 
each of the factors listed below are to you. 
 
When you are making decisions, how it important is 
it for you to... 
Rating 
not at all 
important 1  2   3   4   5   6   7  
very 
important 
1) ...be as satisfied as possible with your decisions. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
2) ...seek as much information as possible before 
choosing. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
3) ...avoid feeling frustrated. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
4) ...think long and hard about the available 
information. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
5) ...focus on your feelings to guide your decisions. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
6) ...learn more about the different choice options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
7) ...avoid decisions that may leave you in a bad 
mood. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
8) ...appreciate the full complexity of the available 
information. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
9) ...avoid feeling regret about your decisions. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
10) ...focus on the available information to guide 
your decisions. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
Note. Odd-numbered items correspond to emotion-regulation subscale; even-numbered items 
correspond to information-seeking subscale. 
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Appendix C. Beliefs About Choice (BAC) Measure 
 
Instructions: People make many decisions in their everyday lives. For some everyday 
decisions, there are many options to choose from, while for other decisions there are 
only a few options. In this questionnaire we are interested in what you think are the 
consequences of having more versus fewer options when you make decisions. For 
each statement below, please indicate how much you agree or disagree using the scale 
provided. 
 
In general, having more versus fewer options means 
that... 
Rating 
strongly 
disagree 1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
strongly 
agree 
1)  ...I will be able to think more clearly and easily 
about the decision. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
2)  ...I will make an objectively worse decision. (R) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
3)  ...I will be more motivated to choose one of the 
options. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
4)  ...I will be more confident in my decision. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
5)  ...I will feel more regret about my decision. (R) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
6)  ...I will feel more frustrated while making a 
decision. (R) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
7)  ...I will have to spend more effort making a 
decision. (R) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
8)  ...I will be more satisfied with my decision. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
Note. Reverse-coded items designated with (R). 
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